Self-Defeating

Many pro-natalists are claiming that there is something oxymoronic and self-defeating about antinatalism. Their claims, can be divided into three sub-claims: antinatalism being theoretically oxymoronic, ethically oxymoronic, and practically oxymoronic.
The theoretically oxymoronic sub-claim is that antinatalism is self-refuting because antinatalists claim they should never have been born, but if so, how could they have made this claim? The claim’s existence is negated by its own existence. One must experience existence to be able to condemn it.
The ethically oxymoronic sub-claim is that antinatalism is self-defeating because if the more caring people would not procreate, and the less caring people would keep procreating, the world would become a worse place, which is exactly the opposite of antinatalists’ goals, as it would be filled with careless people.
The practically oxymoronic sub-claim is that antinatalism is self-defeating because if only antinatalists would not procreate, after one generation, there would no longer be any antinatalists, and everyone would be pro-natalists.

In the following text I’ll shortly address these claims.

Antinatalism Being Theoretically Implausible

The fact that had antinatalists never been born they couldn’t have argued that they should have never been born, is not by any means in contradiction with the fact that after they were born, and experienced existence, they think that no one should be created. Obviously one must experience existence to be able to condemn it, and indeed each and every antinatalist has, and that’s part of the reasons why we wish to prevent it from others. Antinatalism is about preventing the creation of others, not about retroactively preventing the creation of self.

It would have been a contradiction if antinatalists were arguing somehow that they should have never been born, before being born, and chose to be born anyway (sorry but sometimes ridiculous arguments must be refuted by ridiculous means). But obviously no one was a person before being created and no one chose to be created, so there is nothing self-refuting about people being forced to be created, and later, after experiencing existence, condemning it, and arguing that no one should be created.

If this claim was true then it was also implausible to say something like ‘my yellow fever is terrible, I should have never gone on that trip’, because had that person never gone on that trip this claim about the suffering from yellow fever couldn’t have been made. Supposedly, this claim’s existence was also negated by its own existence. But I fail to notice any self-refuting in the claim that I should have never gone on that trip, or should have never experienced something that I prefer to never have experienced, and that is all the more so the case since, as earlier mentioned, antinatalism is about preventing something from others not about retroactively preventing something from self, and so in this relation it would be that others should not go on that trip so to not get yellow fever.

And generally speaking, ethical arguments that deal with ethically unpermissive actions, or with negative rights, don’t necessarily need to be self-sustaining. There is nothing irrational or self-refuting about a philosophy or about ethical claims that their implementation would bring about the situation in which there would be no one there anymore to make them.
It would be irrational and self-refuting only if one of the premises or claims of antinatalism is that antinatalists should exist, but obviously there is nothing of this sort in antinatalism.
True, if everyone would agree with and apply antinatalism there would be no antinatalists anymore but there also won’t be a need for them anymore.
The supposed negation of the argument in case it is implemented is not a problem, and that is because sentient beings are more important than arguments. In fact arguments are important only because and as long as there are sentient beings, and this claim, by implying that antinatalism is self-defeating, suggests otherwise. It won’t matter that there would be no one to claim for antinatalism when there are no sentient creatures anymore. To claim otherwise is to suggest that it is a problem that once the solution is fully implemented there is no problem to solve anymore. But the fact that solutions are only relevant when there are problems is in fact a very basic antinatalist notion. As the famous antinatalist saying goes – there is no need to create a need; and in relation to the theoretically oxymoronic claim I am adding that an option that negates all problems is not a problem, but an absolute solution.

Antinatalism Being Ethically Implausible

There is something ambivalent if not absurd in the claim that antinatalism is self-defeating because if the more caring people would not procreate, and the less caring people would keep procreating, the world would become a worse place. It is as if the claimers are saying: ‘hey antinatalists you are alright! we need more people like you, so why don’t you ditch this whole antinatalist thing and make more of yourselves’, and that is absurd because the reason they want more antinatalist people is exactly the reason that made people antinatalists in the first place – because they care about suffering. The exact reasons that make them think that antinatalists should procreate are the ones who brought antinatalists to conclude that everyone mustn’t procreate.

People who are claiming that it is wrong to forbid procreation for ethical reasons because then only unethical people would procreate, should advocate, if anything, at least for conditional antinatalism, something in the form of ‘people can procreate on the condition that they are ethical’. Are any of these claimers making such a claim? Hardly likely. Instead they are choosing the easier and cowardly road – trying to convince ethical people that they must procreate too.
If the supporters of this claim are so bothered with problems in the world, why not asking careless people to stop procreating, at least correspondingly to asking antinatalists to start?

According to the logic of the supporters of the ethically oxymoronic claim, they should advocate for that only ethical people would procreate, and the rest will not. But this is not their claim. Obviously they are just manipulatively trying to turn antinatalists’ caring against their world view, and so to justify their own world view.

But even if it wasn’t the case, creating more people with the aim of solving the world’s problems, hoping that the created people would be caring, and would be capable enough to solve them, is probably the worst way to try solving them. There is no guarantee that caring people would create caring people. And even caring people are causing a lot of harm just by being alive, even if they really try not to.
Clearly it is much more efficient to focus our energy on convincing other existing people to solve world problems instead of creating more and more people, all the more so when many of which are most likely to be merely additional problems instead of solving existing ones.

But even if they won’t, the best way to create more ethical people is by activism, not by procreation. Ethical people who create new people, except the enormous harm their children would inevitably cause just by being alive, prevent from themselves to invest most of their time, energy and resources in existing problems.

According to the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the average cost of raising a child from birth through age 17 is $233,610. And many children are living at their parents’ expense (who often also pay for college education) way past 17.
And it’s not the only huge financial cost which must be considered. If parents devote on average around 3 hours a day to their children, by the time they turn 18, it sums up to about 20,000 hours.
Other crucial considerations are hard to measure. It is hard to tell how much energy raising children costs but it surly is enormous.
If all that time, money and energy is invested in solving existing problems, it would surly have a much more positive effect than raising children.

Not to procreate is to not harm the person created and to not harm others (those who would be harmed by the person created), while procreating is to cause harm to the person created as well as to others. The chances that the child would be such an efficient activist that it would be worth all the harms caused by it and for it, are very very low. It is much more probable that the person created by antinatalists would cause more suffering than it would reduce (not to mention that many children would choose not to be activists at all, and so would only cause suffering and won’t reduce any), and would have more negative experiences than positive ones. Most people, even ones without exceptional problems, are frustrated, bored and dissatisfied most of the time. Most are not satisfied with their jobs, their social life, their intimate relationships, and there is a huge gap between their expectations of themselves and of the world, and what their actual lives are like. Even without exceptional problems and life of misery, it is easy to see that most people are dissatisfied. While all that is the case for every person, since this claim suggests intending children to solve the world’s problems, that means adding an enormous weight for them to carry on their shoulders, as well as exposing them to the horrors of the world. Antinatalists are suffering because of what goes on in the world, why would they want to do that to their children?!

Even if, for the sake of the argument, I will ignore the problems involved in turning children into a means to an end (in this case it is not even using someone for something, it is creating someone for something), there is no guarantee that the assignment of the created children to change the world would ever succeed. The persons created might be totally unfit for being the activists expected of them. And there is not even a guarantee that the person created would even become an activist, not to mention not harm others, and surly not that it would be such an amazing and efficient activist that any harm caused to and by that person would be worth it.
On the other hand if people would devote the same time, energy and resources to turning themselves and other people who already exist, into super-efficient activists, it would be much more sensible, efficient and morally justified than creating new people to solve problems.

Antinatalism Being Practically Implausible

The practically oxymoronic sub-claim is probably the most common one. Being so, it is commonly addressed by antinatalists, so I’ll keep it short.
Basically, antinatalists commonly counter argue this claim, by arguing that antinatalism is not inherited, evidently all antinatalists were born.

The ‘practically implausible’ claimers can counter this counter argument claiming that antinatalists were created in times when it was harder not to procreate. But probably the vast majority of antinatalists are younger than 50 years old, meaning most were created in the 70’s and later, namely, after the social revolutions of the 60’s, and in times where it became socially acceptable to choose not to procreate. It is highly unlikely that so many people who were carriers of the “antinatalism gene” (according to this claim they must be more or less equivalent to the number of current antinatalists) have chosen to nevertheless procreate in times when it was no longer unacceptable not to. I am not at all ignoring the fact that social pressure to procreate was still put on people (as is to this very day, especially on women), rather that it was significantly reduced at some parts of the world, surly to the point that had there truly been some kind of “antinatalism gene” then at least its carriers who lived in these societies, would have forsaken procreation.

Having said that, I think that behavioral and belief systems have a strong genetic component. Certainly not to the degree implied by the above pro-natalists claims, but definitely more than implied by many antinatalists who counter these pro-natalists claims.
It is still hard to determine the nature vs. nurture debate, however, there are plenty of evidences supporting that both play very important roles. And in any case, I don’t know if there is any scientific denial of the crucial impact genetics has in shaping a person’s personality, preferences and positions.

People are born with certain genetic predispositions, and they obtain other dispositions throughout their lives. These significantly affect the positions they may or may not accept during their lives. People are not blank slates and in addition they are not rational creatures. This makes it even harder for ideas, no matter how right and rational, to be accepted by people simply because they are right and rational.

There is no reason to think that an idea would prevail just because it is rational, or right, or just, or ethical. This is not how the world works. It would be a bit exaggerated to claim that the world acts on the basis of might is right, as that is not always the case. But unfortunately it is closer to that than to being rational, right, just, and ethical.

There is nothing rational, right, just, and ethical about creating someone who would be tortured for its entire miserable life, merely to enjoy nibbling that creature’s corpse for a couple of minutes.
There is nothing rational, right, just, and ethical about solving conflicts and disputes by violence not to mention wars.
There is nothing rational, right, just, and ethical about discrimination, no matter on what grounds; be it gender, skin color, sexual orientation, weight, height, or species.
There is nothing rational, right, just, and ethical about the fact that the most crucial decision in anyone’s life – the very fact of being created, where, when, to whom, and with which genetic makeup – isn’t and can’t be made, or even be slightly influenced, by that person.
And yet, all this and a lot more, are so natural and accustomed parts of life on earth.

Ironically, thinking that eventually rationality is destined to succeed, is irrational.
Our world is not rational. It runs by irrational systems, and it is consisted of irrational creatures.

People have innate predispositions.
That doesn’t mean that indeed us antinatalists should procreate so there would be more of us, as evidently the number of antinatalists is growing, and obviously all antinatalists have been created by probably natalist parents, so they were convinced by arguments, or experiences they have gone through. What it does mean is that there would be many people who will never be antinatalists because their innate predispositions, independently of and all the more so in addition to the pro-natalist indoctrination they have been brain washed with their entire lives, would overcome rational ethical arguments they may encounter. We would never convince these people. No matter how hard we’ll try.

So the conclusion derived from these claims, especially from the ethical one, is false and even peculiar, but its premise is at least partly right. It is true that mostly less caring people would procreate, and it is probable that predispositions for less caring would be passed on to their children, and it is even more likely that less caring values would be bequeathed to their children as they themselves obtain less caring values. This is still not a reason for antinatalists to consider procreation, but it is a reason for antinatalists to consider a change in their activism.

There is a threshold for our ability to influence people not to procreate and it has a lot to do with caring. If future generations would be less caring because they would be brought up by less caring parents, and maybe even maintain a less caring genetic makeup, then indeed the world would deteriorate even more. Clearly the way to stop this is not by caring people creating people as well, an option that as earlier mentioned, will not solve the problems and is more likely to make things even worse. It will not change the odds between caring and indifference. These in any case would remain significantly against us. And it is not going to change for the better any time soon. We need a comparative advantage in order to defeat the vast carelessness and indifference. And that is not going to be a knockdown rational argument, a witty meme, or an ingenious slogan.

My aim of course is not to deject any of you. I appreciate any antinatalist activism since each person not created is less suffering caused. My aim is that antinatalists would think much bigger than their near circle, and much farer than their activism lifespan. I am lamenting the fact that the suffering is never going to stop as long as antinatalists insist upon depending only on ethical arguments. This route may slowly create more antinatalism supporters, but meanwhile pro-natalists are being created in a much faster rate, diminishing more and more any option of ever turning this around. Only an external power can change this course.

New Argument Old Problem

In the article A New Argument for Anti-Natalism, philosopher Christopher Belshaw argues that antinatalism doesn’t necessarily entail – pro-mortalism.
Belshaw disagrees with David Benatar’s attempt to avoid pro-mortalism while arguing for antinatalism, and defines it as an ‘unstable anti-natalist and anti-mortalist mix’ which may made Benatar’s view more publically acceptable but also less consistent philosophically.

Basically, Belshaw’s criticism of Benatar is that if there is reason not to start lives, then there is reason to end them. And if the smallest amount of pain is sufficient to make life not worth starting as Benatar argues, given that everyone will experience at least some pain, Benatar’s argument for antinatalism entails pro-mortalism.
However, since I have addressed Benatar’s argument in relation to pro-mortalism in a former post, and since Belshaw himself doesn’t focus on Benatar’s argument but rather on his own argument for antinatalism, which he claims succeeds in avoiding pro-mortalism, this will be the focus of the following text.

Pleasure Springboards

Given that babies lack developed conceptions of time and of their own identities as persisting through time, Belshaw argues that as opposed to grown people who will often choose to endure pain in the present for benefits in the future, this can’t be the case with babies who don’t have desires about their longer term futures. Babies live only in the present, and have no desire to tolerate pain in order to acquire future pleasures. For someone unaware of its own future, a good future cannot make up for a bad present. Therefore, hurting babies in the present, for a benefit in the future, which they have no and can’t have an interest in, is morally unjustified.

According to Belshaw when it comes to whom who lacks developed conceptions of time, present pains are not justified by future pleasures. So babies suffer uncompensated pain. But the premise of his new argument for antinatalism goes way further than that. He claims that babies are distinct from the persons that develop from them. From his point of view the baby is one being, the person is another.
To illustrate and simplify the matter he suggests thinking about babies not as an integral gradual process of becoming a person but more in a sense of a distinctive transformation stage:

“Imagine that our relationship to a baby is like that of a butterfly to a caterpillar. Rather than a piecemeal emergence of complex psychological properties, and thus of the person, imagine instead that a baby is born, lives a baby life for about eighteen months, then falls into some sort of coma. Its life is over. After a year a pretty much fully-fledged person emerges. What should we think of this baby’s life? Is it worth living?” (p.124)

This distinction is of course very significant in an ethical sense, since not only that hurting babies is wrong because it is trading the present pains for the future pleasures of a creature who lacks developed conceptions of time, it’s a trade of pleasures and pains between different lives. And that is much worse, and highly questionable ethically.

Thinking about babies not from the point of view of the persons they supposedly become, but as a separate creature, then that creature – who has no developed notion of itself, or of time, no desire to live on into the future, no ability to think about pain and decide to endure it – experiences a lot of suffering. That is the case of even totally healthy babies. They all come into the world screaming, cry a lot, suffer colic and teething pains, stress, discomfort, emotional distress and etc. Therefore Belshaw argues that a baby’s life is not worth living.
Some may argue that a baby is an indispensable stage in creating a wholly worthwhile life, but this is not at all in the interests of, and brings about no compensations or benefits for – the baby. It would have been better for the baby had it never been created.

Belshaw argues that gradualism has no bearing here:

“Even if we come into existence by degrees, the two beings here remain distinct. And so the conclusion still stands. If we value our own lives, want there to be more people in the world, we may well continue to make babies. But what’s good for them isn’t good for us, and vice versa. We’re exploiting them, and exist only because this other creature has suffered. I may be glad that there was a baby. But it would have better for the baby never to have been born.” (p.124)

So basically his argument is that the creation of a person necessarily involves the creation of a baby which isn’t a person but is certainly a sentient creature, and one who suffers very much, without consent, and without compensation as the person that would develop from that baby is not a continuation of the baby. The creation of a person necessarily involves an exploitation of a baby. It is forcing suffering on a creature so that someone else would benefit, because it is not that the pleasures of the future person compensate the baby for its pains, and the baby has no concept or any interest in the future.

Arguable Conception and Unarguable Exploitation

Belshaw doesn’t seem to be bothered with a person being created, but with a baby being created in the process of creating a person. He is bothered with the harms caused to the baby, harms for which the baby would never be compensated. He is bothered with the harms that creating a person brings about not to the person created but to the baby which is according to him, although an indispensable stage of a person, still a separate entity.
Since Belshaw separates between a person and the baby that person had developed from, his argument is actually more of a version of the harm to others argument than it is a version of Benatar’s argument. Only that in Belshaw’s version of the harm to others argument, although there should be no disputes regarding the ‘harm’ part, there are many regarding the ‘others’ element. While his distinction between a baby and the person that grows from that baby is disputable, in the case of the original version of the harm to others argument, meaning absolutely unquestionable harms caused to absolutely unquestionable others, there is no room for any dispute. The only reason that nevertheless there is much dispute is because people are speciesist and careless about the suffering of others, not because the sacrifice of trillions of sentient creatures can ever be ethically justified.

The specific distinction Belshaw claims for may be arguable but the sentiment isn’t.
Even if it is disputable that each person necessarily exploits the baby that s/he supposedly developed from and that each person exists only because a baby has suffered, given that each person needs to feed oneself, dress oneself, clean oneself, clean oneself’s clothes, heat oneself in the winter, cool oneself in the summer, live somewhere, work somewhere, move around somehow, entertain oneself, consume enormous amounts of energy, produce enormous amounts of waste, and etc., and considering that each of these necessarily harm others, it is undisputable that each person necessarily exploits others and that each person exists only because others have suffered.

And people don’t even seem to care that much about the fact that numerous other sentient creatures are suffering so they can enjoy themselves. Most are still choosing, time and again, the most harmful ways to feed themselves and regardless of how harmful it is to others. Harming others while consuming food is inevitable, even if it is plant based, local, organic and seasonable, but most people insist on the worst kinds of food production, ones that involve the greatest exploitation and suffering. Therefore, in most cases, creating a person is sacrificing chickens to be cramped into tiny cages with each forced to live in a space the size of an A4 paper, calves to be separated from their mothers, and cow mothers to be left traumatized by the abduction of their babies, pigs to suffer from chronic pain and various diseases, sheep to suffer from lameness, turkeys to barely stand as a result of their unproportionate bodies, ducks to live out of water and in filthy crowded sheds, rabbits to be imprisoned in an iron cage the size of their bodies, geese to be aggressively plucked for their feathers, and male chicks to be gassed, crushed or suffocated since they are unexploitable for eggs or meat.

So even if you reject Belshaw’s distinction within a person, the following description he made is surly the case when it comes to a person’s relation with others “we are inevitably free-riding on the several misfortunes of small, helpless and shortlived creatures”.

Even if you disagree with Belshaw’s distinction between the future person’s supposed wholly worthwhile life and the baby’s lack of any interest, compensations or benefits for that, you can’t disagree that other creatures surly lack of any interest, compensations or benefits for a person’s supposed wholly worthwhile life. Even if we refuse to accept Belshaw’s distinction, the thousands of creatures overall that would be harmed so a person would benefit, will not be compensated. Therefore even without his distinction move, the creation of a person is indeed a trade of pleasures and pains across different lives.

Belshaw’s argument may be new but in some ways it reflects on an old problem. He deeply emphasis the exploitation of babies for the pleasures of persons, yet he deeply ignores the obvious exploitation – one that doesn’t require the metaphysical complexity of differentiating between a person and the baby from which that person had developed – of probably thousands of nonhuman animals by each human person.

Preventing that suffering is my main motivation. And people being so speciesist and careless about the suffering of others is my main reason not to wait for them to change.
If Belshaw’s main motivation is to prevent babies from being sacrificed for the sake of persons while avoiding pro-mortalism for persons, he can support a non-pro-mortalist option, but still ensure that people will stop sacrificing babies. Although for slightly different motives and perceptions than mine, he can support forced sterilization.

References

Benatar, D. Better Never to Have Been (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006)

Belshaw, C. A New Argument for Anti-Natalism South African Journal of Philosophy 31 (1) 117-127(2012)

A Very Intentional Harm

Like many other antinatalists, I am referring to procreation as a crime, a very serious one.
This definition is often counter argued by claims such as that procreation is not a crime since as opposed to cases of supposedly real crimes, in procreation there is no intention to harm, and according to pro-natalists it is actually the exact opposite.
Since I have addressed the alleged opposite intention of procreation along many former texts, here I’ll only shortly address the aspect of the seemingly unintended harm in procreation.

Allegedly, there is a difference between crimes which are considered as crimes and the crime of procreation which is not considered as one by non-antinatalists, since the first case is of causing intended harm and the latter is being consciously aware of harm with no explicit intention of causing it. However, when people are aware that their unnecessary actions are bound with inevitable harm how is that unintentional? Not wishing to harm another person by performing an action might be less wrong than performing an action with an intention to harm another person, but knowing that harm is inevitable is enough to make that harm intentional even if the harm was not intended but an unintended inevitable consequence of an action with a different intention. In other words, if people are consciously causing unnecessary harm to someone else, or consciously unnecessarily put someone in harm’s way, the fact that causing that unnecessary harm to another person wasn’t their intention doesn’t make it less of a crime as long as they were aware of inevitably causing unnecessary harm.

One explicit example of an inevitable harm is death. Given that everyone must die, people who procreate are intentionally creating people who would necessarily die. They would also necessarily be harmed by many other things, but even if we’ll assume that that is speculative, despite that clearly it is definitely not, everyone must surly die. Although people don’t procreate with the intention of causing their children’s death, they are aware of their children’s inevitable death. And so all parents can’t avoid intentionally creating people who would inevitably die.

People might truly not want their children to be harmed, but they are willing to force them to be harmed so they themselves won’t be harmed by not creating them.
That claim can be exemplified by anticipating parents’ reply to an hypothetical proposal such as will they be willing to trade a guarantee that their children would never be harmed and will always be happy, in exchange for them never seeing them again, which probably only a few if any parent would agree to. This thought experiment is an exemplification of the fact that people don’t create people for these people’s sake but out of their own interests.

Of course, there is no need for this thought experiment to prove that all procreations are self-interested as no procreation can even theoretically be about the created person as no one has an interest in being created before being forced to exist, nor is it needed to prove that had people truly cared about their children not being harmed they would have chosen the surest, most reliable and absolutely guaranteed way to prevent any harm caused to any of them which is of course to never create them in the first place. However, the fact people don’t procreate to intentionally harm their children but would not intentionally give their children up so to protect them from any harm by choosing that option in this fictional deal, or by choosing not to create them in real life, is another indication of their nevertheless intentional harm.

People prefer that their children would suffer from everything that they would suffer from during their whole life, which at least some of it is necessarily known in advance like the just mentioned inevitable fact of death, and also the accompanied fear of death, not to mention all the suffering they would cause to others during their whole life time, and all that so they would not suffer themselves from not breeding. This is how selfish people are. So selfish that it is pointless to try and convince them not to procreate for moral reasons. So selfish that we need to find by-passes in order to prevent them from breeding and by that prevent all the suffering that would have been caused to the children they would have created had it been up to them, and all the suffering that the children that they would have created had it been up to them would have caused to others.

Four Fatally Flawed Criticisms Over Better Never to Have Been

In chapter six of the book Why Have Children? The Ethical Debate, the author, Christine Overall, offers four criticisms of David Benatar’s Better Never to Have Been. Three of which show, according to her, why Benatar’s arguments are fatally flawed and that he therefore does not succeed in establishing a strong argument against all procreation, and one criticism demonstrates the potentially dangerous consequences of accepting his theory.
In this post I’ll try to show why all of her criticisms are fatally flawed and that she therefore does not succeed in establishing a strong argument against antinatalism. The motivation is not because I agree with all of Benatar’s arguments for antinatalism (I don’t and I’ve addressed several of them here, here, here, here, here and here), but because I disagree with her objections.

Criticism 1

 In her first criticism, Overall accepts, for the sake of argument, Benatar’s assumption that it is legitimate to ascribe value to the absence of good or bad, even without any sentient being to experience the absence. What she doesn’t accept is Benatar’s asymmetrical claim – the absence of bad things, such as pain, is good even if there is nobody to enjoy that good, whereas the absence of good things, such as pleasure, is bad only if there is somebody who is deprived of these good things. She thinks that the absence of good things is also at least sometimes bad, even if there is nobody who is deprived of those good things.

This criticism shouldn’t be mistaken as identical to the one I have elaborated about in the post regarding Benatar’s asymmetrical claim. Overall doesn’t criticize Benatar for using a double standard, one for pain and another for pleasures when it comes to non-existence. Her criticism is regarding the claim that the absence of pleasure is not bad if there is no one who is deprived of it. So on the face of it, if Benatar had used the same standard for pain, she would still have a disagreement with him. Her problem is not Benatar’s double standard but his standard for pleasure in non-existence.
And she suggests refuting his claim that the absence of pleasure is not bad unless there is someone to whom it is a deprivation by the following thought experiment:

“Imagine a nation of ten million people. Five million of them suffer from chronic illness and experience great and unremitting pain. The other five million are free of chronic illness and are able to experience happiness and fulfillment. One of God’s angels appeals to God and says, “Surely the suffering of five million of these people is too great. Can you not do something about it?” God agrees. “I will roll back time,” says God, “and fix these five million people so that they do not suffer from chronic illness and pain.” Time is rolled back, the unfortunate five million are re-created, but this time without their original vulnerability to chronic illness and pain. Like the originally happy 50 percent, they, too, are now capable of happiness and fulfillment, and the angel is pleased.

But after the angel appeals to God, God might alternatively say, “I see that these five million people are suffering. I will roll back time and change things so that this entire nation of individuals, all ten million of them, will not exist. That way, the suffering of five million does not exist.” Time is rolled back, the nation of people no longer exists, and so a fortiori there is no chronic illness or pain and no suffering whatsoever.

I suggest that in this second scenario the angel would be justified in being appalled by God’s actions. The nonexistence of the good of the happy and fulfilled five million is far too high a price to pay for the absence of bad of the suffering five million. What the thought experiment shows is that, contrary to Benatar’s claim, the absence of good can be bad, not “not bad.” The angel is correct to regret God’s failure to re-create the five million happy people; mere indifference on the angel’s part would be inappropriate.

I think another important point can be made if we imagine that God responds to the angel’s horror by trying another approach. Once again, then, God rolls back time, but this time he re-creates the nation with only the original happy five million in existence. The suffering five million do not exist. But once again the angel is, I predict, disappointed, for the angel believes correctly that with respect to most lives nonexistence is usually too high a price to pay for the avoidance of pain.” (p.98)

 I fail to see how this thought experiment refutes the claim that the absence of pleasure is not bad if there is no one for whom this absence is a deprivation. How can the angle’s disappointment somehow prove that the absence of pleasures of the 5 million people had they never existed under one of the scenarios, deprives them of anything?

Her angle’s disappointment is a reflection of her preference, not a proof of her claims. It doesn’t explain why a world in which there is suffering as well as pleasures is better than a world in which there is no suffering and no pleasures, but simply repeat her preference. How does it prove anything? To refute Benatar, Overall needs to prove that the absence of pleasure is bad even if there is no one who is deprived of that absence. Inventing an angel that is disappointed of god doesn’t provide any evidence for this claim. It is just her opinion hidden behind an invented angel, in a ridiculous hope that it can somehow strengthen her claim.
All this thought experiment shows is that she (represented by the angel she invented) thinks that it is preferable that people would suffer but also enjoy themselves, but we knew that before the thought experiment which doesn’t add anything to the claim but a sensational scenery.

Furthermore, I don’t think there is any justification for the angel’s appalled reactions. If anything s/he can feel that it is a shame that god didn’t choose to bestow happiness despite that he could have, but there is nothing appalling in a scenario where no one experience anything bad. No reason to be appalled by not choosing an allegedly good option (according to the angel) over an option in which no one is harmed by anything.

The angel shouldn’t be disappointed since there is no price to pay for the avoidance of pain, let alone a price too high. The whole point of Benatar’s claim is that there is no harm in non-existence, so simply arguing that there is a harm – evidently the angle is disappointed – is not a refute of his claims. It is just saying the opposite with no serious counterarguments but that the angel she invented begs to differ.
It is the angel of her creation which is appalled and disappointed, others’ angles may react differently. A true angel would not risk some with being harmed only so that others might benefit, but choose the least harmful option which in this case is obviously non-existence.

In my view her angel is actually a demon since s/he prefers that 5 million people would suffer, all the more so great and unremitting pain, over that they would never be forced to ever experience anything negative and won’t ever be deprived of experiencing anything positive. To be disappointed with a scenario in which no one suffers any pain and any deprivation of anything good, and to prefer over it a scenario in which half of the population is suffering, is cruel.

Later in Criticism 1, Overall suggests that we must as opposed to Benatar’s claims deal with potential harms by preventing them, not by preventing the existence of people who might or do suffer them. And she gives several examples to prove her point. One of them is that “It would be bad if the person who holds job X experiences sexual harassment or racial bias.” But the way to deal with it, according to her, is to ensure (as far as possible) that sexual harassment and racial bias do not occur to the person who eventually wins job X. “We don’t deal with the situation by refusing to fill the position or by abolishing the job altogether. That is, we do not decide to prevent the potential suffering by not bringing “the person who holds job X” into existence.” (p.101)

First of all, refusing to fill the position or abolishing the job altogether are not options compatible with non-existence, since if this job exists it implies that it is necessary or at least desired by at least some people, so not filling it or abolishing it altogether would harm them in some way. But no one has to exist, and no one is harmed by not existing. Before anyone exist, they don’t want anything, including not to exist, and so are not harmed by not existing. That is a very crucial point in Benatar’s claims which Overall chooses to ignore whenever it suits her.

In addition, the example she gives is quite manipulative because the injustice of sexual harassment or racial bias directs our intuitions to fight it instead of allegedly give up and let injustices win. This is far from being the point, and more importantly far from being a generic representative of the harms of life which not all of them are social injustices. This example doesn’t work in the case of non-detected inborn diseases which are not a result of social injustice. Even if we assume that sexual harassment and racial biases can be totally eradicated, some harms of life can never be. Sexual harassment and racial bias are unfairness examples that should be fought against, chronic pain, disappointments, aging and death are unfairness examples that it is impossible to fight against, and impossible to avoid.

Another example she displays is:

“It would be bad if students who take Philosophy 204 go through the pain of failing the course. So we never offer Philosophy 204 to students. Since pain and suffering are possible in any role or position we might take on, by parity of reasoning Benatar’s theory means that we should never create any new roles or positions or at least never fill them. Any theory with implications that broad is surely mistaken.” (p.101)

Again, like in the case of job X, never offering Philosophy 204 to students is not compatible with non-existence, since as opposed to non-existence which can’t deprive anything from anyone who doesn’t exist, preventing something from existing people who do want that something, does deprive them and so harms them.

Another false move Overall is making is presenting Benatar’s theory as if it is about avoiding risks. However, despite that he does mention and support risk aversion, this is not his main claim. His main argument is not that the risk of harm in forcing someone into existence is too big, but that harming is a fact. He doesn’t try to avoid a risk of harm which is too big, but to prevent any harm. That claim might be debatable even among antintalists (as opposed to the risk claim which I think is non-debatable), but at least it is truly his claim, and so the one Overall should have addressed.

But perhaps more importantly for that matter, generally speaking, the claim that “any theory with implications that broad is surely mistaken” is quite disappointing. A theory cannot be judged by whether its implications are too broad for people. When most of humanity were extremely racist and pro-slavery, egalitarian theories weren’t less right than they are today, despite that they were viewed as extremely broad and so, according to Overall, surly mistaken. Same goes for feminist views or animal rights views. The moral status of animals can’t be derived from whether people find the vegan diet as a too broad implication. Animals moral consideration must be derived from their own traits, not from peoples’ willingness to accept the implications of the theory. Suggesting otherwise is a reversal of the logical order of things. Moral theories must dictate the behavior not the other way around.

Another illustration of the supposed absurdity in Benatar’s claims Overall mentions, is of one of her undergraduate students who suggests the following analogy:

“Before you is a person with a bag full of jellybeans. The jellybeans come in two flavours: cherry-red, which you love; and black licorice, which you hate. . . . You are unaware of the proportion and size of the jellybeans because the bag is opaque. The person gives you the following choice: you may reach for a handful of jellybeans or not. If you choose to reach for the jellybeans, you must eat them. Would you be better or worse off having chosen to take a handful?
Each jellybean represents an experience, either harmful or beneficial, and that taking the handful represents coming into existence. Every handful will have at least one black jellybean in it, which represents one’s death, and most likely many more, representing all the various instances of suffering that we experience in a lifetime. From Benatar’s point of view, we should never take a handful because we will always be forced to eat at least one black one, which is bad, but if we refuse to take a handful at all, we will avoid the black ones altogether. Benatar’s advice to a putative jellybean eater would be, “Do not reach for the jellybeans.”” (p.101)

First of all, this thought experiment is a bad analogy to pre-existence scenario since it forces us to think as existing persons who allegedly choose whether to experience life or not, despite that it is actually impossible. The source for this confusion is derived from how hard it is to imagine non-existence as a preferable position. Most people find it hard not to imagine non-existence as something bad, as a deprivation, as some sort of mental prison, a state in which their consciousness floats outside of existence or something of this sort. Non-existence is not only a state they find hard to imagine, it is not a state at all. People can’t put themselves in such a position because it literally doesn’t exist. Non-existence is not a comparable state with existence. So they imagine other states in which they would be deprived of everything they experienced during their existence. Despite that this is not the case, this is the intuition of many. Non-existence is not an existential alternative for a bad life therefore prioritization in this case is irrelevant. It is irrelevant to ask someone if they rather exist or not since there is no option of non-existence for that someone.
The analogy is false since when someone chooses not to take a handful s/he feels that s/he might be missing something. But non-existing people don’t feel anything.
If anything, this analogy is only relevant in cases of people having suicidal thoughts, weighing the benefits and harms of existence in order to make a decision.

However, if I’ll accept the analogy for the sake of the argument, Benatar would probably argue that non-existence is preferable since there is no way to avoid the black jellybean taking a handful, and there would be no deprivation of the cherry-red jellybean when not taking a handful. His claim is not statistical and so statistical analogies don’t refute his claims. Even if the ratio between black and cherry-red jellybeans was highly in favor of the cherry-red, this is not relevant in Benatar’s view since in non-existence one doesn’t miss the cherry-red and is not forced to eat the black. So non-existence is always an advantage over existence in which one may have plenty of cherry-red jellybeans or only a few, but certainly some black ones.

Having said that, besides being false I think there is something very manipulative and degrading in this analogy. Suffering in life is not like eating a detested jellybean. For many it is a living nightmare. If we are asked to imagine not jellybeans but favorite food, favorite music, beautiful sunset, an orgasm, career satisfaction and etc. instead of the cherry-red jellybeans, and clinical depression, loneliness, broken hurt, car accident, death of loved ones, cerebral palsy and etc. instead of the black jellybeans would it still seem as a highly risk-averse outlook on the side of Benatar? It is much easier to claim that it makes more sense to take a handful of a bag full of jellybeans risking that some would be disgusting, but it seems a whole different scenario to take a handful of a bag where you can draw brain cancer or rape.

Another very important issue is missing from this analogy, and that is the price paid for each jellybean. Behind each jellybean there are many creatures who suffered for the creation of that jellybean. So for other creatures every jellybean, particularly the cherry-red, are actually pitch black.

Criticism 2

In her first criticism Overall assumed, along with Benatar, that the absence of bad things and the absence of good things can have value, whether positive or negative, even in the absence of anyone experiencing the absence. But that was for the sake of the argument. Like many others, she thinks that Benatar’s claim that the absence of pain is good, even if that good is not enjoyed by anyone, is false since he ascribes interests to non-existent persons. I’ve thoroughly addressed this issue in the post regarding Benatar’s asymmetry argument so I’ll make do with a shorter response to Overall’s claim.
Many people have difficulty making sense of the idea that never existing can be better for a person who never exists, because there is no subject for whom never existing could be a benefit. In other words, they wonder how can the absence of pain be good, if there is no one for whom it would be good? For something to be good, it needs to be good for someone, and in non-existence there is no someone.

I obviously agree with the common objection that the non-existent can’t be benefited. However, Benatar doesn’t necessarily attribute interests to non-existent persons, at least not in a literal sense. Here is an explanation in his own words taken from Better Never to Have Been:

“Now it might be asked how the absence of pain could be good if that good is not enjoyed by anybody. Absent pain, it might be said, cannot be good for anybody, if nobody exists for whom it can be good.
The judgement made in 3 (the absence of pain is good, even if that good is not enjoyed by anyone) is made with reference to the (potential) interests of a person who either does or does not exist. To this it might be objected that because (3) is part of the scenario under which this person never exists, (3) cannot say anything about an existing person. This objection would be mistaken because (3) can say something about a counterfactual case in which a person who does actually exist never did exist. Of the pain of an existing person, (3) says that the absence of this pain would have been good even if this could only have been achieved by the absence of the person who now suffers it. In other words, judged in terms of the interests of a person who now exists, the absence of the pain would have been good even though this person would then not have existed. Consider next what (3) says of the absent pain of one who never exists—of pain, the absence of which is ensured by not making a potential person actual. Claim (3) says that this absence is good when judged in terms of the interests of the person who would otherwise have existed. We may not know who that person would have been, but we can still say that whoever that person would have been, the avoidance of his or her pains is good when judged in terms of his or her potential interests. If there is any (obviously loose) sense in which the absent pain is good for the person who could have existed but does not exist, this is it. Clearly (3) does not entail the absurd literal claim that there is some actual person for whom the absent pain is good.” (p.30)

And another one taken from a later article called Still Better Never to Have Been: A Reply to (More of) My Critics:

“Now it is obviously the case that if somebody never comes into existence there is no actual person who is thereby benefited. However, we can still claim that it is better for a person that he never exist, on condition that we understand that locution as a shorthand for a more complex idea. That more complex idea is this: We are comparing two possible worlds—one in which a person exists and one in which he does not. One way in which we can judge which of these possible worlds is better, is with reference to the interests of the person who exists in one (and only one) of these two possible worlds. Obviously those interests only exist in the possible world in which the person exists, but this does not preclude our making judgments about the value of an alternative possible world, and doing so with reference to the interests of the person in the possible world in which he does exist. Thus, we can claim of somebody who exists that it would have been better for him if he had never existed. If somebody does not exist, we can state of him that had he existed, it would have been better for him if he had never existed. In each case we are claiming something about somebody who exists in one of two alternative possible worlds.
When we claim that we avoid bringing a suffering child into existence for that child’s sake, we do not literally mean that nonexistent people have a sake. Instead, it is shorthand for stating that when we compare two possible worlds and we judge the matter in terms of the interests of the person who exists in one but not the other of these worlds, we judge the world in which he does not exist to be better.” (p.125-126)

Nevertheless, there is a crucial problem with Benatar’s asymmetry, but not the one Overall and many others refer to. The main problem is not that the absence of pain is good, even if that good is not enjoyed by anyone, nor that the absence of pleasure is not bad unless there is somebody for whom this absence is a deprivation, but that in the same world, the one in which the person doesn’t exist, when it comes to the absence of pain the person is treated as if s/he exists (otherwise the absence of pain can’t be good for him/her) but when it comes to the absence of pleasures s/he is treated as if s/he doesn’t exist (otherwise the absence of pleasures would be bad for him/her, and the only reason it isn’t is because the non-existent is not deprived of pleasures). In other words, the claim that the absence of pain is good, even if that good is not enjoyed by anyone, is a counterfactual claim (statement which expresses what could or would happen under different circumstances). Meaning, if that person were to exist pain would be bad for that person. However, he doesn’t use the same standard when it comes to the absence of pleasures. If pain would be bad if someone would exist in quadrant 3 of his famous formulation than how come pleasure wouldn’t be good if that person would exist in quadrant 4? Just as pain would be bad for person X if existed, pleasure would be good if person X existed. Just as the non-existents are not in a position to miss any pleasure, they are also not in a position to be relieved of not experiencing any pain. Since his argument is counterfactual, the absence of pleasure should be valued as bad for the non-existent, just as the absence of pain is valued as good for the non-existent.

Had Benatar been consistent regarding counterfactuality, I think there was no problem stating that the absence of pain is good even if that good is not enjoyed by anyone, however, then he obviously couldn’t have claimed that the absence of pleasure is not bad unless there is somebody for whom this absence is a deprivation, but would have to claim that the absence of pleasure is bad even if there is nobody who is deprived of this pleasure. And then of course there is no asymmetry but symmetry and the whole point of his argument would obviously be lost. However my point here wasn’t to prove that Benatar’s asymmetry argument is valid, but that the main problem with it is not that he ascribes interests to non-existing people, but that he ascribes two different categories to the two quadrants (quadrant 3 and 4) which are on the same column (and so should have been treated the same in a categorical sense).
So Benatar’s asymmetry argument is invalid, but not for the reasons Overall presents.

Criticism 3

Overall’s third criticism regards Benatar’s Quality of Life Argument. Like many of his other critics she wonders how can it be a harm to come into existence if most of those who have come into existence are pleased that they did?

Benatar’s answer is that their self-assessments are completely unreliable indicators of life’s quality, mainly due to a number of psychological features which distort their ability to make objective assessments of the actual quality of life and constitute instead a fallacious positive assessment. Benatar mentions three main mechanisms, which are The Pollyanna Principle,
Adaptation, and Comparison with Others. I have referred to and briefly explained each in the post regarding his Quality of Life Argument, so there is no point in doing it again here. To better understand how come most people don’t say it would be better had they not existed, it is recommended to read it first.

Bedsides these three psychological features which distort the ability to make objective assessments of the actual quality of life, another important factor in affecting people’s perceptions is that, as earlier mentioned, it is hard to imagine non-existence. Not that it should be a required part of making life assessments, but it seems that Benatar’s argument, that life is much worse than people think it is and therefore being forced into existence is a very serious harm, necessitates that people would think that their lives are not worth living. Many people tend to confuse the claim that it is better never to have been, with the claim that their lives are better not to continue, despite that these are totally different claims. Moreover, most people find it hard not to imagine losing what they have experienced if their lives had never started, and so they think that it is better that they have been born, though clearly this is not what would have happened had they never existed. Obviously they wouldn’t lose anything because they wouldn’t be in the first place. The fact that it is hard to process that thought, along with The Pollyanna Principle, Adaptation, and Comparison with Others, also cause many people to prefer existence, no matter how hard and painful their lives are, over the falsely perceived unknown and scariness of non-existence.

People think it is better to live hard lives than missing them, even though they won’t miss a thing had they never had a life. Nobody is harmed by a great life that nobody lived. But someone is definitely harmed by living a horrible life.

Overall is aware of Benatar’s explanations, yet is highly critical of his supposedly pretension when evaluating other people’s lives. But Benatar’s main concern and motivation is not the inaccuracy of the assessment of other peoples’ own lives, but rather the inaccuracy of people’s general assessment of life since the main problem with the falsehood of the assessment is its ethical implication – if people think that life is much better than it actually is, it would be much harder to convince them not to force new people into existence. The motivation behind the claim that life is far from being as good as people tend to think it is, is not to outsmart people, or to depress them, but to prove them wrong about the chances that their children would have good lives.

But even if Benatar was truly wrong in claiming that life is much worse than people tend to think, still, each bad moment happening in life is totally unnecessary. Every pain, every sickness, every fear, every frustration, every helplessness, every regret, every broken-heartedness, every moment of boredom and etc., are all needless. They exist only because the person experiencing them exists. They exist because the parents of that person have forced existence on that person, and that person existence on others. There is no good reason for that to happen. Every problem could have been easily prevented instead of being difficultly solved, if solved at all. People exist because they were chosen to exist by other people, not because it is necessary in any way. People can choose whether to create a sentient creature who would necessarily suffer, and they choose that it would. They choose that that person would experience pain, frustration, fear, boredom, death and the fear of dying for most of its life, they choose it would get disappointed, sick, rejected, and humiliated.
Yes, that person may enjoy parts of life too, but that is not mandatory, while it is mandatory that this short list of bad things will happen at some point, at least once in that person life. Pleasure is optional, happiness hardly is, and suffering is inevitable. Why would anyone willingly force a sentient creature into this condition?

The fact that people who are living horrible lives still don’t think they were better never to have been, is not an indication that life is not that horrible, but exactly the opposite. It goes to show how deeply trapped humans are in the life mechanism. People are victims not only of their biology but also of their psychology. They would adapt and adjust themselves and their expectations according to how bad the lives they are forced to endure are. Low expectation, adaptation ability, and the fact that everyone else’s lives is not much better, can’t justify bad situations which shouldn’t have been created in the first place.
But an even sadder fact is that humans are not really looking for justifications to procreate. Most just do. They don’t even really need mechanisms to sooth their worries about the future of their children, because as inevitable as it is that bad things would happen to their children, it rarely crosses their minds. Unfortunately people are that apathetic to the fate of others, even when it comes to their future children, and definitely when it comes to the rest of the victims of procreation.

Criticism 4

Overall’s last criticism is not intended to show that Benatar’s theory is mistaken, but to show the possible negative effects and implications, for women in particular, if Benatar’s theory is accepted and widely adopted. She writes:

“Benatar is surprisingly oblivious to the implications of his theory for women’s rights and well-being. Most of his discussion of procreation is curiously gender neutral. At the same time, his theory implies that women’s reproductive labor produces bad consequences. That is, the idea that it is better in every case never to have been implies that women’s reproductive labor in pregnancy, birth, breastfeeding, and even rearing children contributes to the accumulation of net harm on this planet.

It’s unlikely that downgrading procreation in this way would do much for the status of women, particularly in societies where women’s status is dependent primarily on their role as childbearers. If Benatar’s theory were to gain credence (unlikely though that may be), then one of women’s primary social contributions, recognized even (or especially) in the most misogynist societies, would be seen as a liability. Might this view lead to an increase in the infanticide of girls or to assaults on pregnant women?” (p.115)

That is a very strange claim coming from a feminist such as Overall, since it implies, or at least accepts the anti-feminist view that women are first and foremost reproduction machines, then breast-feeding machines and then mothers. How have women, whose particular interests and perspectives were rightly mentioned all along the book, been reduced to walking uteruses when she wants to criticize Benatar?
Ironically it is Overall who treats women as if procreation is their role in life. She and not Benatar is the one that turns women into mothers and nothing else.

There is no doubt that women carry most of the burden when it comes to children. They carry all the burden of pregnancy, birth, breastfeeding, and most of the burden of child rearing. However, Benatar’s claims in no way focus on these aspects of procreation but on the decision to procreate. Antinatalism, and I think it is safe to say Benatar’s version included, is about the decision to create a new person, about the harm of being forced into existence, not the harm of giving birth or breastfeeding.

Benatar’s claims are against the decision to create a new person so claiming that there is something misogynic about his claims means that it is only women’s decision whether to procreate or not. That is not a very feminist claim since it implies that it is women who always want children. As far as I am concerned the decision to procreate is under the full responsibility of the parents. Whether it is a woman and a man, two women, two men, or one woman or one man. Antinatalism is against the decision to create new persons no matter who makes this horrible decision, not against women because they are the ones who get pregnant. Antinatalism is not about the technical procedure, but about the ethical one.

So Benatar’s claims are rightly gender neutral since the decision to create a new person is usually a decision of the parents, which is usually a woman and a man. The only cases in which procreation is truly not gender neutral, are when only one of the parents pushes for creating a new person. But even in these cases it is not necessarily the woman, and even if it was, the man is by no means exempted from the moral responsibility of making a wrong decision.

When it came to sexual harassment and racial bias in job X she argued that “the way to deal with it is to ensure (as far as possible) that sexual harassment and racial bias do not occur to the person who eventually wins job X. We don’t deal with the situation by refusing to fill the position or by abolishing the job altogether”. How come the same line of thought doesn’t apply in the case of societies where women’s status is dependent primarily on their role as childbearers? Why not ensure that these misogynist societies would stop treating women as if their status is dependent primarily on their role as childbearers? How come she all of a sudden suggests submitting to this suppression, all the more so manipulatively using it to criticize Benatar?
How does it make sense to accept the existence of the most misogynist societies in the world, but not to accept antinatalism’s conclusions? How can she justify submitting to the harsh rules of misogynist societies, and ignoring the sacrifice of millions of people and billions of animals who would be forced to live horrible lives?

If anything, the fact that many women around the world don’t even have a say regarding procreation – they must breed whether they want to or not – is not a reason to accept their procreation coercion, but a reason to accept the coercion of the sterilization of everyone, since then no women could ever again be forced to create new persons, no matter how bad the men in their lives want them to.
Although this is not my main motive, it certainly is another very important benefit of the idea of forced sterilization.

References

Benatar, D. Better Never to Have Been (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006)

Benatar, D. Every Conceivable Harm: A Further Defence of Anti-Natalism
S. Afr. Journal Philos., 31 (2012)

Benatar, D. Grim news for an unoriginal position Journal of Med Ethics 35 (2009)

Benatar, D. Still Better Never to Have Been: A Reply to (More of) My Critics
Journal of Ethics (2013)

Bradley, B Benatar And The Logic Of Betterness Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy (2010)

Cabrera Julio, A Critique of Affirmative Morality: a reflection on death, birth and the value of life
(Brasília: Julio Cabrera Editions 2014)

Harman, E. Critical study of Benatar (2006). Nouˆs 43: 776–785.

Parfit, D. Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1984)

Shiffrin, S.V. Wrongful life, procreative responsibility, and the significance of harm. 1999
Legal Theory 5: 117–148

Overall Christine, Why Have Children? : The Ethical Debate (The MIT Press 2012)

A Monstrous Argument

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A very common pro-natalist claim is that the pleasures of the created person are expected to be greater than the harms and therefore it’s in the interests of a person to be created.
There are several ways to counter this claim, such as that life is never as good as one thinks it is (Benatar’s quality of life argument) and that no matter how good one’s life supposedly is, it is always better for that person never to have been (Benatar’s asymmetry argument), or arguing that the claimed statement is even technically impossible since pleasures are not really intrinsically good but are actually tension release of cravings which always precede them and so by definition they can’t be greater than harms (which are also more important), or arguing that even if it was possible that the pleasures would be greater than the harms, procreation would still be unethical since there is no guarantee that that would always be the case, or that it is still unethical since causing someone harm without prior consent is wrong even if pleasures were intrinsically good and even if it could be guaranteed that they would be greater than harms, or that even if pleasures were intrinsically good and even if it could be guaranteed that they would be greater than harms, and even if consent could have been obtained beforehand, then in that hypothetical scenario the pleasures might have outweighed the pains of the created person, but that would certainly not be the case for every other person who would be affected by that creation. In other words, due to the harm to others, all the more so since it is so extensive, even if it was possible that for the created person the pleasures would outweigh the harms, it can never be the case for most of the ones who would be harmed by that person, and therefore its creation can’t be morally justified.
For all these reasons independently, let alone collectively, procreation is harmful and immoral.

However, in this text I wish to focus on the less common yet quite frequent pro-natalist claim regarding, not the supposed interests of the to be created person, but those of the to be creating people, or in other words, the claim that we need to consider the interests of the people who want to procreate and would be harmed if they don’t (a harm which according to pro-natalists’ false assumptions regarding the general harms of procreation, might be greater than that of the created person).
This claim is often related to the first one as even most of the more adherent pro-natalists don’t think that cases of miserable lives are justified by the interests and desire of the parents. However, merely by placing these interests together, these pro-natalists are claiming that harming others should be weighed against the harmful interests of the harmers, and that the harm can be justified if the harmers’ desire is strong enough. In other words, the interest of the harmer needs to be considered against the interest of the harmed, and so, peculiarly, the stronger the desire to create the platform for harms, the greater the chances of the harms to be justified, since according to the logic of this claim, the stronger the desire the stronger the harm caused by withholding it.

Due to the fact that procreation is extremely harmful and morally wrong for the reasons specified earlier in this text, it is unethical, if not absurd, to consider the interests in doing something which is basically wrong, as a counter argument for the action’s wrongness. It is balancing the harmfulness of a crime with the interests of the criminals to perform it. A strong interest to do something wrong doesn’t make it right. Neither does the resulted frustration if the wrong action is prohibited. To claim otherwise is to nullify criminalness, as all that offenders should claim is that by stopping them from committing a crime we are violating their interests. The interests of every offender are violated if they can’t continue with their offences, is it a justified reason to let them go on with their crimes? If the interest of a person to rape is really strong, should we somehow balance the interest of that person to rape a girl with her interest not to be so extremely harmed by that person?

According to the logic of this claim, if a person wants to create someone more than that someone would want to avoid the harms caused to it as a result of its creation, then the harms are justified. That turns the interests of the person with the ethically wrong desire, to be as morally important as the interests of the ones who would be harmed as a consequence of carrying out that ethically wrong desire. That is ethically wrong and distorted since the situation is forced on that person without consent, and since there is no way for anyone to guarantee that it would be the case that the desire of the parent to create a new person would be stronger than the desire of the created person not to be harmed by being created, and since this claim permits harming others as long as the selfish and harmful interest of the creating person seemingly overpowers the interests of every victim involved (which as earlier mentioned, practically can never be the case and is addressed here as such only for the sake of the argument).

Even if, for the sake of the argument, we’ll accept the logic of its premises, the harm of procreation is way too grievous and enormous to ever be seriously considered against the interest of the desiring procreators. Procreation is not only forcing needless and pointless suffering on the created person, but is also, and in fact first and foremost, forcing needless and pointless suffering on thousands of other sentient creatures, since each person created is hurting thousands of sentient creatures during a lifetime.

People are harming others on a daily basis, mostly to feed themselves but also to cover themselves, to move from place to place, to heat their houses, to build their houses, to communicate with each other, to entertain themselves, and practically through most of the things they consume.

Once the interests of everyone involved in procreation are considered, and once a true consideration of the extent of harm caused to each individual by procreation is taken, given that it is probably thousands of sentient creatures who are sacrificed for each created person, with many of them being tortured in factory farms, then suggesting to nevertheless consider people’s desire to procreate is a monstrous argument.

Speaking of monsters, the argument that the more someone wants something, even that something being extremely harmful to others, the more the interests of that person to fulfil that harmful desire should be considered, and the more likely it is to be balanced with, or at least reduce the deficit of, the harms caused by fulfilling that desire, can be viewed as a very loose version of Nozick’s notion of utility monsters, in this case a desire based one. That is in a sense that for that claim to work, at least hypothetically speaking, it needs “desire monsters”, meaning people whom their desires are so strong that they defeat many others’ interests. (originally, Nozick‘s utility monster is a thought experiment designed to criticize Utilitarianism by presenting the hypothetical option of an entity that gains so much greater pleasure than others, that following classical utilitarian principles, everyone must sacrifice their pleasures for the sake of the utility monster in order to achieve the greatest utility possible, however, the aim of my very loose paraphrase of it here specifically, is not to join the criticism or to defend Utilitarianism, but merely to function as an illustration of the fictitious level of intensity the desire to procreate must reach for it to be considered against the harms to others). In other words, to morally consider people’s desire to procreate despite the enormous harm forced on others, these people must be “desire monsters” – the more they desire something the more they would get hurt by not getting it.
But obviously the claim, that the harm to the people who want to procreate but don’t can be greater than the harms caused by procreation, is wrong ethically and it is implausible even hypothetically. That is because the desire to do something harmful (and the initial desire in this case is harmful and morally wrong), mustn’t be weighed against the desire not to be harmed, and because obviously “desire monsters” – people whose desires to procreate are so strong that preventing it from them would be more harmful for them than the harms caused to the person they would create and the harms caused by the person they would create and the harms caused by the person they would create – can’t really exist.

It is even questionable whether the “harm” of preventing someone’s harmful desire from being fulfilled can even be seriously considered a harm, so it most certainly can’t be seriously considered against the harms caused by that harmful desire.

But it goes even further than that. What should be weighed against the interests of people who want to procreate is not only the people who would be born into miserable lives, and not only the sentient creatures who would be harmed by the newborns of the current people who want to procreate, but all the harms, and all the misery, and all the suffering that would ever be caused by humans. The equation is between one generation of people who would sacrifice their desire to procreate, and all the victims of all the procreations that would ever occur.

Human procreation is not only risking the created persons who might be sacrificed for the sake of people’s desire to procreate, it is ensuring that numerous generations of sentient creatures would be sacrificed for one desire of one generation, of one species only.
And since people don’t even take seriously the possibility that their own children might suffer extremely, there is no chance they would ever take seriously the certainty that numerous generations of sentient creatures would suffer extremely because of their procreation. That’s why we mustn’t wait until people understand that it is ethically impossible to justify procreation, but do everything we can to make it impossible to procreate.

The Dire Effects of Divorce on Children

When couples decide to create a person together, they don’t consider the dire effects on their children if they would later split up. But given that nowadays more and more couples, at some point in their life together, decide to split up, people must consider very seriously the effects that separation has on children, before they decide to create ones.

The chances of a child to go through the split up of its parents are very high.physical and social effects
Half of all children in the U.S will experience the breakup of their parents. Of these, close to half will also experience the breakup of a parent’s second marriage. And one of every 10 will experience three or more parental marriage breakups.
Researchers estimate that about 40 percent of all first marriages, about 60 percent of second marriages, and about 73 percent of all third marriages, end in divorce. The average first marriage that ends in divorce lasts about 8 years. Creating a person before marriage can increase the risk of divorce by about 25 percent.

The risk of divorce is 50 percent higher when one spouse is a child of divorced parents, and 200 percent higher when both partners are. In addition, children of divorced parents are 50 percent more likely to marry another child of divorce.

And these divorce statistics don’t accurately reflect the real numbers of children who are no longer raised in one place by two parents, as many people live apart without officially separating, and many others start a family without ever getting married, so if they split up they are not counted in the statistics. These children may not be part of the official statistics but obviously they are affected just as much, as clearly it is not the marriage part which matters but the fact that their parents are not together anymore. Having said that, this doesn’t include children of single parents, because the main trigger behind most of the effects is the parents splitting up, not that there was one parent in the first place.
Another important factor for that matter is that not all of the misfunctioning couples decide to split up. Many decide to maintain their toxic relationships and many children are being raised in a toxic environment which tremendously affects them.

Starting a family, people rarely consider the consequences of that family someday splitting up. Had people considered creating a person seriously, they would have first considered the various potential consequences of their relationship not working out very well (something that happens to most people at some point) on the person they are creating, including very serious emotional, physical and social effects.



Emotional and Mental Health

Children in the process of a divorce, go through the psychological phases which are often associated with loss, such as denial, anger, bargaining, and depression. During the denial stage, the children do not accept the separation of their parents, they keep believing that their parents will reunite.
The denial stage is often followed by the accusation phase, in which children blame their parents for ruining their life by not getting back together.
In the bargaining stage children are trying to fix the damage done by changing their own behaviors, believing that their parents have split up because of their supposed misbehavior.
During the depression stage children are depressed, tired, sad, and may have difficulty in controlling their emotions.

Children are usually aware of tension among their parents, they usually know that something is wrong. However, even children who know what divorce means, and who have witnessed the continuous tension and fights between their parents, are not really prepared for the news that their parents are splitting up. Once it breaks out, often when one parent leaves home, the child is shocked. Naturally, children miss the parent who left the family. Drifting away from a parent, even if it is an abusive one, horrifies a child.

The ongoing conflicts between the parents, even after the split up, trigger an anxiety disorder among many children. Anxiety may manifest itself in children in the form of different reactions, some children withdraw in order to avoid any worrying situation and abstain from social activities, while others develop defense mechanisms, such as retreat, rejection, repression and projection.



Generally speaking, the existence of negative factors, such as the conflicts experienced by the child within the family, the lack of communication between parents, economic difficulties and stress factors, makes it hard for children to adapt to the new stage in their lives. As a consequence of the inner conflicts they experience, they may suffer from fear, sorrow, anger, guilt, insecurity, helplessness, loss, loneliness, abandonment, rejection, sense of being unloved, and physical problems like stomachache, headache and chest pain, and psychosomatic disorders like oversleeping and overeating, particularly within the first years following the divorce. However, a study of children six years after a parental marriage breakup revealed that even after all that time, these children tended to be lonely, unhappy, anxious and insecure.

More specifically, various effects of divorce are age related:

Between Birth and Age of One
The thought that babies in their infancy will be least influenced by a divorce, assuming that they are still unaware of many things, is wrong. Prominent changes in behaviors of babies at these ages were observed after divorce. The most common ones are crying, sleep disorders, malnutrition, and the loss of interest in toys. Ignorant parents may feel free to argue in front of their babies, significantly harming them, for the short and long term.

Between the Ages of One and Three
Children find changes to be very challenging.
They are scared of separation and the visits from one parent’s home to another’s might be rather traumatic.
They may show bad temper or may cry for the other parent.
They may want to stay with one of the parents and never let it out of their sight, and when that parent attempts to go, they may desperately cling to him/her.
They may suffer from sleep disorders such as suddenly falling asleep or staying awake the whole night.

Between the Ages of Three and Five
Children fear of being abandoned.
They feel guilty, angry, nervous, scared, sad and confused.
They are concerned about whether or not they are safe or loved.
They blame themselves for the divorce.
They believe that their hostile thoughts or bad tempers caused their parents to split up.
They tend to develop tantrums, irritability, and sometimes stuttering.
They dream about the reunion of their parents.
They make futile efforts in order to unite their parents.
Behavioral regression such as wetting the bed, lapses in toilet training, thumbsucking, sleeping with a discarded doll and etc., are also common.

Between the Ages of Six and Eight
Children feel physically torn apart by loyalty conflicts.
They assume they will be deprived of food and toys or will be neglected by their parents.
They usually feel abandoned.
They may have feelings of rejection, loss, and confusion as to whom they should be loyal, along with the feelings of guilt.
They fear that they have lost the separated parent eternally, and they get scared of the idea of another person taking their place.
They often cry and show bad temper.
They feel emptiness and have difficulty concentrating at school.
They may regard the divorce as a battle requiring them to take sides.
They long for the parent living away from home and try to unite them again, and some even write notes full of love, pretending to be the other parent sending the note to his/her spouse.
They develop nervous attitudes, such as nose-picking, hair-twisting, making faces, stuttering, nail-biting and chewing pencils, and etc.
They may get furious and aggressive.
Contrary to younger ones, children at this age do not take the blame on themselves but put it on their parents. They feel rage against their elders, are disappointed and consider themselves rejected.

Between the Ages of Nine-Twelve
Children in this age feel ashamed of what’s happening in their family, they feel they are different from other children.
They may fight with their peers or just keep away from them.
They may start having nightmares.
They may get offended or nervous without knowing the underlying cause.
They may feel a sense of anger, pain, anxiety and weakness.
Emotions like the feeling of loneliness, loss and deprivation may lead to depression or other emotional problems.
Since the children at this age tend to distinguish everything as black or white, they are quite sensitive to the pressures put by their parents with respect to taking sides in the matter.
They understand the psychological states of their parents more easily and wonder whether they will be able to take care of them or not.

Between the Ages of Thirteen-Eighteen
During this period, it may be rather painful and shocking for a child to see their parents divorce.
They may show reluctance in getting involved in emotional relationships.
They experience a sense of loss and rage.
They may be scared of getting hurt, or assume that their own marriage, one day, will also fail and they may be afraid of repeating the same mistakes their parents made.
The financial matters and the psychological states of their parents worry them a great deal.
They may have difficulty concentrating at school.
They feel discomfort with their parents’ dating and sexuality.
They may experience chronic fatigue.
They may easily sink into a depression because of the fact that family is now no longer a safe harbour to rely on.
Teenagers with divorced parents are a lot more likely to experience mental health problems that will require medication, counseling, or both.
This is the age group in which divorce is mistakenly thought to have the least impact on children. Whereas, at this age, children who already carry the burden of puberty, are facing an additional stress factor with the divorce of their parents.

More generally, parents splitting up increases the risk that children would take positions which are unsuitable for their development stage. These can be emotional such as supporting one of the parents and younger siblings, or practical such as housekeeping. That is more likely in the earlier stages of the split up, when parents are usually deeply immersed in the battle between each other, and often feel hurt, furious and lonely, so they are not attentive to their children’s needs or appropriate roles in the family.

While children go through their parents’ divorce, unresolved conflict may lead to future unexpected risks. Research has shown children who have experienced divorce in the previous 20 years were more likely to participate in crimes, rebel through destructive behavior which harms a child’s health, with more children reporting they have acquired smoking habits, or prescription drug use.
Studies have also found depression and anxiety rates are higher in children of divorced parents.
A study of almost one million children in Sweden demonstrated that children growing up with single parents were more than twice as likely to experience a serious psychiatric disorder, carry out or attempt suicide, or develop an alcohol addiction.
College students whose parents were divorced were more likely to experience verbal aggression and violence from their partner during conflict resolution.
Children of divorced parents may have lower scores on self-concept and social relations.
Anxiety and depression seem to worsen after a divorce event.

Children whose family is going through divorce may have a harder time relating to others, and tend to have less social contacts. Partly, this is a result of abandonment issues that affect adult children of divorce for many years afterward. As children, they cannot make sense of why mom and dad split up, and as adults the fear of abandonment, the notion that love can simply stop, or that conflict leads to permanent separation, continues to harm them.

Children whose parents have split up develop problems trusting people. They believe that when things get rough, they would be abandoned. Many never learn skills for solving conflict in relationships. They desire intimacy and love, but the closer someone gets to them, the more terrified they are of getting hurt, or being abandoned.

The physical health of children is also highly affected. While at least some of the emotional effects of parents’ separation on children are intuitive, many of the physical effects, and mostly their prevalence and impact, are very surprising. For example it was found that children of divorced parents are at a greater risk to experience injury, asthma, headaches and speech defects than children whose parents have remained together. And in general, they are 50% more likely to develop health problems.

Social Effects

The emotional storm that children growing up with separated parents experience, as well as the significant interruption in their daily lives, very often affect their academic performance. Clearly, the more distracted children are, the more likely they are to not be able to focus on their school work.
They are more likely to have a learning disability or attention deficit hyperactivity disorder regardless of parents’ education, income, or area of residence.
They have less language stimulation.
They are more likely to have lower grade point averages (GPAs) and are more likely to repeat a year of school.
A study of eleven industrialized countries showed that children growing up with separated parents had lower math and science scores.

Teenagers are more likely to drop out of high school when their parents get divorced. This is not simply an expression of teenagers’ rebellious spirit. It can often happen because teenagers drop out of school so they can get a job and help their family to pay for rent and food.

Children of separated parents may lose economic security as custodial mothers experience the loss of 25–50 percent of their pre-divorce income. Children living with single mothers are much more likely to live in poverty than children living with both parents.

Children of separated parents may have a weakened relationship with their mothers since divorced mothers are often less able to provide emotional support as they are forced to work longer hours to support the family. Besides increased work time, loss of income may lead to a change in residence which usually also negatively affects children.

Children of separated parents may have a weakened relationship with their father because they spend much less time with him. A study found that fewer than half of children living with their mother after a divorce had seen their fathers at all in more than one year, and only one in six saw their fathers once a week.

Children of married parents attained higher income levels as adults.
Children growing up with separated parents are four times more likely to experience problems with their friends and peers.

Children growing up with separated parents tend to be sexually active at a much younger age.
Of course, this is not necessarily bad in itself, but it is bad because it is not coming from a healthy place and it is not going to healthy places. For example boys have earlier sexual debut and higher rates of sexually transmitted diseases when they have experienced divorce in their family, and girls whose fathers left the home before they were five years old were eight times more likely to become pregnant as adolescents.

I realize that considering all that may come off as a very high standard, but considering the enormous effect that parents’ separation has on children, and the high probability of parents splitting up, it must be another critical thing to seriously consider before creating a person who will anyway be significantly affected by the parents’ relationship, especially in the highly likely case of them splitting up.

The least that parents can do is avoid, by any means, dragging their children into their own battles, and overburdening their child with their own frustrations. But that’s exactly what happens very often. During the divorce process, parents experience a roller coaster of emotions to which their children are extremely sensitive, and they are often the main victims of it. Furthermore, their parenting skills are at a low ebb during the separation process, and that is exactly when their children need them the most.

There is guidance information of how to tell the child about the decision to get divorced which includes instructions such as:

  • Parents should explain to their child about their decision to get divorced in a secure and familiar environment the child is used to and should act together in this.
  • The child should be given detailed information as to where s/he will live after divorce, with which parent s/he is going to stay with, how often s/he can see the other parent and what sort of changes will take place in her/his life.
  • While parents are having a conversation with their children, they should avoid any mutual argument, nor should they blame each other in front of the child.
  • The child should never be asked to take sides in this matter, in other words, s/he should never be put in the position of a referee.
  • Even if one of the parents feels hatred or rage against the other party, no negative criticisms or remarks about him/her should be made behind his/her back.
  • The remarks or expressions likely to hurt the child or make him/her feel guilty should carefully be avoided.

But probably, in most cases, none of this ever happens, and in all cases, it never happens all of the time.

I tried to avoid focusing on the ugliest aspects of parents splitting up, and concentrate on the common issues of common cases of separation, but the fact that millions of children are being used by their parents as weapons against the other parent can’t be totally disregarded.
No child has ever asked to be created and no child has asked to be neglected, pushed aside, or being weaponized due to the separation of the parents.

So many harms, some surprising, at least in the sense of how significant and deeply affecting they are, yet people don’t and will not take all of that under a serious consideration.
Some of it is a result of people’s tendency to think that bad things only happen to other people and never to them, but most of it is a result of people tendency not to think at all about the consequences of their actions, no matter how dire and harmful they may be, even to their own children.

References

Blackwell, D.L. 2010. Family Structure and Children’s Health in the United States: Findings from the National Health Interview Survey, 2001–2007. CDC Vital and Health Statistics. 10: 246

Bramlett, M.D., and L.F. Radel. 2014. Adverse Family Experiences Among Children in Nonparental Care, 2011–2012. National Center for Health Statistics, n. 74, http://www. cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhsr/nhsr074.pdf

Carlsund, A., Eriksson, U., Löfstedt, P., & Sellström, E. (2013). Risk behaviour in Swedish adolescents: is shared physical custody after divorce a risk or a protective factor? European Journal of Public Health, 23(1), 3-8. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1093/eurpub/cks011

ChildStats.gov. 2013. America’s Children: Key National Indicators of Well-Being, 2013: Emotional and Behavioral Difficulties (2013). http://www.childstats.gov/americas children/health3.asp

Cohen, G.J. 2002. Helping children and families deal with divorce and separation. Pediatrics 110: 1019–23

Dunlop, R., A. Burns, and S. Bermingham. 2001. Parent-child relations and adolescent selfimage following divorce: A ten year study

Edwards, A.N. 2014. Dynamics of Economic Well-being: Poverty, 2009–2001: Household Economic Studies (2014). United States Census Bureau Web Site. http://www.census.gov/prod/2014pubs/p70-137.pdf

Ellis, B.J., J.E. Bates, K.A. Dodge, D. M. Fergusson, L.J. Horwood, G.S. Pettit, and L. Woodward. 2003. Does father absence place daughters at special risk for early sexual activity and teenage pregnancy? Child Dev 74: 810–1

Emery, R. E. (1999). Marriage, Divorce, and Children’s Adjustment. (2nd ed., Developmental Clinical Psychology and Psychiatry). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications

E. N., Song, J., J. G., Mailick, M. R., & Floyd, F. J. (2015). The relative risk of divorce in parents of children with developmental disabilities: impacts of lifelong parenting. American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities. 120(6), 514-26. doi: 10.1352/1944-7558-120.6.514

Fagan, P. F., & Churchill, A. (2012). The effects of divorce on children. Marriage & religion research institute

Forehand, R., Biggar, H., & Kotchick, B. A. (1998). Cumulative Risk Across Family Stressors: Short- and Long-Term Effects for Adolescents. Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology. 26(2), 119-128

Jeynes, W.H. 2001. The effects of recent parental divorce on their children’s sexual attitudes and behavior. Journal of Divorce and Remarriage 35: 125

King, V. 2002. Parental divorce and interpersonal trust in adult offspring. Journal of Marriage Family 64(3): 642–56

Mooney, A., C. Oliver, and M. Smith. 2009. Impact of family breakdown on children’s wellbeing evidence review DCSF-RR113. London: University of London, Institute of Education, Thomas Coram Research Unit

Pong, S.L., J. Dronkers, and G. HampdenThompson. 2003. Family policies and children’s school achievement in single-versus two-parent families. Journal of Marriage and Family 65: 681–99

Rotermann , M. (2007). Marital breakdown and subsequent depression. Health Reports. 18(2):33-44. Retrieved from https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/17578014

Strohschein, L. 2005. Parental divorce and child mental health trajectories. Journal of Marriage and Family 67: 1286

Soria, K. M., & Linder, S. (2014). Parental Divorce and First-Year College Students’ Persistence and Academic Achievement. Journal of Divorce & Remarriage, 55(2), 103-116. doi:10.1080/10502556.2013.871919

 

Anti-Natalism and the Future of Certain and Certainly Avoidable Suffering

In an article called “Anti-Natalism and the Future of Suffering: Why Negative Utilitarians Should Not Aim For Extinction” Magnus Vinding argues that people should act so to reduce suffering as much as possible, and should do whatever accomplishes that goal, however antinatalism is not the best way to do that. In his view antinatalism “misses the bigger picture and instead focuses only on whether single individual lives are worth starting for the sake of the individuals who are brought into existence. We have to take a much broader view to address that question, the question concerning how to reduce the most suffering in the world.” Although there are antinatalists who solely focus on the sake of the person forced into existence, many others argue against procreation for being morally wrong regardless of the wellbeing of the created person (the consent argument for example is highly popular among antinatalists), and many also consider the harm to others. In fact, although this blog doesn’t solely focus on the harm to others, in my view, it definitely must be the main claim for antinatalism. So his assumptions regarding antinatalism are mistaken, some of us do take a much broader view to address that question, and that’s exactly why some of us aim for human extinction.

Vinding doesn’t define himself as a pro-natalist, but very much like many pro-natalists he conveniently chooses to present antinatalism as if it is based on one argument by David Benatar. And he criticizes Benatar for claiming in the preface of Better Never to Have Been that he has no expectation that his book or its arguments will have any impact on baby-making:

“So it seems that Benatar actually does not argue for anti-natalism with any serious conviction that it will change the world much (“Procreation will continue undeterred”). Rather, his book seems more like the work of a mathematician who wants to show the truth of a counter-intuitive conjecture for its own sake, because he feels the truth “needs to be said”, not because it will “make (much) difference” in terms of impact in the world.” (p.3)

Besides that it is wrong to present a whole movement, let alone one that is abundant with various arguments, ideas, objections, inner dilemmas, nuances and etc., as if it is a one claim movement, with one thinker, and besides that many antinatalists oppose Benatar’s arguments, including myself, this book was published in 2006 and was based on an article written in the late 90’s, back then antinatalism was much less socially accepted than it is now (an improvement which is to a large extent thanks to Benatar). Since 2006 Benatar himself wrote two more books about the subject, as well as many articles and elaborated replies to his critics, he also attended several conferences, and gave plenty of interviews, in all of which he thoroughly and persistently explained his views regarding the wrongness of creating new persons. So it is unfair to criticize him for being like “a mathematician who wants to show the truth of a counter-intuitive conjecture for its own sake”. Furthermore had it been the case, he wouldn’t have written the third chapter of Better Never to Have Been where he makes the quality of life argument.

I do agree with Vinding that:

“there will always be people who decide to have children, no matter how convincing an argument anti-natalists can make against it, and thus the only way anti-natalists would be able to prevent such people from procreating would be by force”. (p.3)

However I disagree with his predicted scenario:

“And given that people likely also will be willing to defend their right to procreate with force, and given that the proportion of people who will either decide to have children or be in support of such a decision is likely to be the vast majority, the prospects of success for anti-natalists who wish to force people not to procreate looks no better than they do for the nonviolent anti-natalists. In the worst case, a war could break out, and the vastly outnumbered pro-coercion anti-natalists would score a predictable defeat that would leave things largely unchanged…” (p.3)

If the anyway much more desirable option of imposed sterilization on all people without the use of force is found, then his claim is irrelevant. The idea was never to literally force sterilization, but to impose it on everyone using an unforceful method such as a chemical poured into major water systems all over the world, or sprayed all over the world, or developing and spreading virus or bacteria which causes sterilization, or whatever method that can potentially affect everyone without the need to physically force it on everyone. The idea was never one that requires winning a war against pro-natalists.

Anyway, this is not Vinding’s main case against antinatalism. His main claim is that if antinatalism gained instant success today it means that humanity would be left with about a century to cure and prevent all suffering on the planet and on other planets:

“we are by no means guaranteed to be able to end suffering on Earth within the next century. Just consider the oceans with trillions of vertebrates, or the more than a quintillion – a billion billion – insects who live on the planet, and who may well be able to suffer. Making sure that no such beings suffer, or evolve into beings who do, is a huge challenge, and it seems to me that we are far more likely to be unable to accomplish such a thing within the next century than we are to succeed.” (p.4)

Of course humans are by no means guaranteed to be able to end suffering on Earth within the next century, since in order to do that they must first of all want to. Humans haven’t even taken the first step towards ending suffering on Earth which is to at least stop intensifying their share in causing it. Currently humans are still deeply immersed in increasing the suffering on Earth by artificially creating billions of animals who would know nothing but suffering for their whole miserable lives, just so humans could enjoy the taste of their flesh. Humans are way too unethical for anyone to take Vinding’s claim seriously. Let’s see them stop creating and intensifying absolutely needless suffering all the time, before counting on them to ever reduce suffering they are not directly causing.

I fail to comprehend the empirical basis of his argument. Whenever and wherever humans have reached they have wreaked havoc. Humans have consistently hunted other animals, or in the much worse case captivated, domesticated and reared animals for food, exploited them for various uses such as carry them around, carry their belonging, fight in their wars, do their labor, guard their camps, help them hunt, keep them warm, decorate their bodies and homes, serve as the raw material for their tools, killed them when they came near the areas they have conquered from them, and systematically destruct their habitats. So why, as opposed to every single moment in history, would humans all of sudden be such caring creatures whose main task in life would be to help other animals in nature and on other planets? Where is all this compassion now? More than 95% of humans are not even vegans, meaning the vast majority of the human race is still choosing to personally and needlessly harm and abuse other animals, so to expect that they would devote their lives to help animals they haven’t personally harmed? How does it make any sense?

It seems as if Vinding had never read a history book as he presents the issue as if all along history, whenever humans have encountered other animals in nature, they wanted to help them but didn’t know how, while it is exactly the opposite. All along history whenever humans have encountered other animals they wanted to use them for their own benefit, and usually with horrendous success.

When humans have seen other animals hunt each other, they didn’t think to themselves ‘oh, if only we had a way to help these poor animals being hunted’, but more like these poor animals are chasing other animals day after day to feed themselves, when they can confine them instead, and kill them whenever they wish. Humans saw what other animals are doing and made it much much much worse.
Animals in the wild would eventually be hunted or die of disease or hunger, but at least they are free, at least they live in a natural environment and not a filthy and contaminated one, at least they live in their natural society, at least they can eat and drink whenever and whatever they want and not what and when humans decide that they would, at least they can sleep whenever they want wherever they want and not when and where humans decide they would sleep, at least they can spread their limbs, stretch their necks, socialize, breath clean air, clean themselves, fly, roam, run, jump and play. Humans have carelessly and needlessly taken all that away from them. Don’t get this wrong this is not at all a glorification of nature. I agree that life in nature is horrible, only that life under human control is much more hellish. The point is not that nature is good, as it is definitely extremely far from being good, the point is that as horrible as nature is, humanity is nonproportionally worse.
Humans are the world’s biggest problem, not its greatest saviors.

I highly recommend reading the text about The Harm to Others, to get a broader sense of how harmful humans actually are. Vinding’s description gives the false impression that humans are constantly busy with minimizing suffering, while the truth is that most are constantly busy with maximizing it. The risk that suffering on Earth wouldn’t end is because humanity doesn’t care about it, not because it might run out of people.
Most of the world’s suffering is not a result of humans not having enough time to end it, but a result of humans having too much time causing it. The biggest barrier to reducing suffering is the human race, not its extinction.

Interplanetary Exploitation

Vinding argues that the human race must continue not only because it would be the savior of everyone on Earth, but also because it would be the savior of everyone in the universe:

“Even if we were guaranteed to be able to prevent all suffering on Earth for good within the next couple of centuries, this would not give us any guarantee that suffering will not occur beyond Earth.” (p.5)

And how does he suggest helping creatures suffering on other planets…

“The ideal thing would likely be to build a benevolent Von Neuman probe, an advanced spaceship that can travel out in all directions with as high a speed as possible, and which has the technological capability to reduce involuntary suffering in the best way possible wherever it goes.

And what is important to note in this context is that our ability to create such a machine lies even further away in the future than does the ability to “merely” cure Earth from suffering. This must be so, since this probe would have to be able to accomplish both this latter mission of curing Earth from suffering and much more.

So this is the final and supreme reason that counts against anti-natalism: if we take the minimization of suffering seriously, we cannot defend going extinct before we have seeded a cosmic mission to minimize suffering in our future light cone, and it seems safe to say that we will not be able to finish this task any time soon. In order to accomplish our goal of reducing suffering in the world, continued human procreation still seems necessary.” (p.9)

All the suffering currently caused by humans, and all the suffering that will be caused by humans in the future here on earth, if the human race won’t go extinct, can’t be seriously balanced with the hypothetical option that there are sentient creatures outside of earth, and that they are miserable, and that humans (of all creatures) would want and could someday help them using a special spaceship.

It is very cynical, absurd and ironic to argue that all the suffering caused by humans on earth must continue because of the potential suffering in the rest of the universe. That is especially so since humans are extremely far from solving even human related problems.

Hunger wasn’t always a human phenomenon. Surly people were hungry in times of harsh weather, but it was never even remotely similar in kind and extent to the world hunger of the last two centuries. Modern hunger is manmade. It’s a result of politics and economics. And that simple problem that humanity has created by its own hand, to its own kind, wasn’t yet and is still far from being solved. Unlike the case of stopping the creation of new sentient creatures just to torture them, or helping animals in nature, not to mention helping sentient creatures on other planets (if there are any and if it is even possible), this is solving one of the biggest problems humanity has ever faced, and one that is caused by humanity and to its own kind. And it still exists in the third decade of the 21st century. So justifying the torture of trillions of beings by the human race every single year, because maybe someday humanity might build an advanced spaceship that can travel out in all directions with as high a speed as possible, and which has the technological capability to reduce involuntary suffering in the best way possible wherever it goes, when humanity is so far from feeding all its members, and is even farer from stop fighting each other over territories on this planet?

“The pessimistic anti-natalist might object that building such probes is an impossibly ambitious goal, and that we will only cause more suffering by aiming for such a high goal…one could have said the same thing about the goal of creating civilization 70,000 years ago, when there were only a few thousand humans running around on the plains of Africa, a goal that could barely even be envisioned back then. And yet, 700 centuries later, here we are: civilization has arisen, along with computers and civil liberties, and we have more minds working to improve our knowledge, technology, and ethics than ever before. In light of this development, it seems that we should be careful to deem the aforementioned ambitious goal impossible.” (p.10)

Only an extremely passionate human chauvinist, ignorant of humanity’s horrendous past, and speciesist present, can give civilization as a good example. Civilization is an example of the worst thing that ever happened on earth, surely to other animals, but also to humans. All along history humans have used their intelligence and rationality to use, abuse, exploit, manipulate, and control each other and other animals. All along history humans have consistently brought havoc everywhere they have reached. Wars, pollution, torture facilities, concentration camps, factory farms and many many more examples are the products of human civilization and intelligence. Human civilization is an ongoing memorial of exploitation, domination and destruction.

It is really cruel to condemn trillions upon trillions of sentient creatures to such a miserable life because maybe someday humans might build an advanced spaceship that can travel out in all directions with as high a speed as possible, that might help creatures that might exist on other planets.
There is no reason to believe that as opposed to their history on this planet, when humans would reach other planets, they would act differently. Just as they have taken control of every inch on this planet, same is likely to happen on other planets. They would most probably exploit the extraterrestrials they meet and even “export” their earthly exploitation methods to other planets by taking along with them the creatures they are so good at exploiting here on earth, and if that would happen it would multiply the tremendous suffering they already cause.

Vinding conveniently argues that it would be callous “if humanity, after having glimpsed an Earth plagued by suffering, and a future light cone potentially even more so, chooses to opt for eternal peace without doing anything about the rest. That would be nothing but anthropocentric speciesism and a wasted opportunity.” (p.11). Only that as mentioned earlier this is not necessarily the reason for human extinction. It certainly isn’t mine. The goal is not to opt for humans’ eternal peace, but for the end of humans’ eternal tyranny over every other creature on earth.

In the end of his article against human extinction, Vinding calls to promote suffering focused ethics and anti-speciesism. Ironically, human extinction is the immediate and clear inference from suffering focused ethics and anti-speciesism perspective. The conclusion that human extinction is ethically mandatory is more unequivocal and urgent not under anthropocentric antinatalism, but when considering the harm to others. Then, human extinction is not a desirable by product of antinatalism, but a silent scream coming out of the throats of trillions of miserable sentient creatures.

References

Magnus Vinding Anti-Natalism and the Future of Suffering: Why Negative Utilitarians Should Not Aim For Extinction 2015

Essential Human Forced Sterilization

The philosopher Thomas Metzinger suggests a thought experiment called Benevolent Artificial Anti-Natalism (BAAN), in which a full-blown autonomously self-optimizing post biotic superintelligence system has come into existence, aimed to assist humanity with ethical decisions. The superintelligence system is benevolent and fundamentally altruistic, so it fully respects humans’ interests and the axiology originally gave to it. The system has a better understanding of humans’ minds and values than humans themselves have, for example, it is familiar with humans’ cognitive biases which disturb and mislead their rational thinking. In Metzinger’s words:

“Empirically, it knows that the phenomenal states of all sentient beings which emerged on this planet—if viewed from an objective, impartial perspective—are much more frequently characterized by subjective qualities of suffering and frustrated preferences than these beings would ever be able to discover themselves. Being the best scientist that has ever existed, it also knows the evolutionary mechanisms of self-deception built into the nervous systems of all conscious creatures on Earth. It correctly concludes that human beings are unable to act in their own enlightened, best interest.”

Since the superintelligence system knows that bad is stronger than good, and that biological creatures are almost never able to achieve a positive or even neutral life balance, and that no entity can suffer from its own non-existence, it concludes that non-existence is in the own best interest of all future self-conscious beings on this planet. “Empirically, it knows that naturally evolved biological creatures are unable to realize this fact because of their firmly anchored existence bias. The superintelligence decides to act benevolently.”

The idea behind this thought experiment is to help humans think about some of the aspects involved in artificial intelligence, as well as serving as a cognitive tool helping to prevent important ethical issues from turning shallow and be affected by biases. Regarding antinatalism, Metzinger argues that: “one of the points behind it is that an evidence-based, rational, and genuinely altruistic form of anti-natalism could evolve in a superior moral agent as a qualitatively new insight.”

However, as smart, elaborated, and efficient as the superintelligence system would be, it is not very likely to help advance antinatalism, for two main reasons, first, since this superintelligence system would be originally designed according to humans’ values which are extremely pro-natalist, there is no reason to believe, even as a thought experiment, that the superintelligence system would infer such unusual and uncommon conclusions.
Second, even if the system would nevertheless infer such conclusions, obviously humans would simply ignore it.
The problem with antinatalism is not that its supporting thinkers are not smart and educated enough, or that people are too perplexed and in need of a more factually authoritative guidance, but that people simply don’t want to accept the antinatalist imperative.

Take an easier ethical imperative such as veganism for example. Veganism is much less violent and oppressive, it is much more sustainable, it is much healthier, and yet…
Veganism is definitely not a matter of lack of knowledge or unconvincing arguments, but a lack of motivation on the side of the offenders.
There are many valid and informative antinatalist arguments, the problem is that there are only few who are ready to listen. I don’t think that the problem is with spokespersons, so I don’t believe that a thought experiment regarding a superintelligence system would help people think about some of the aspects involved in procreation, or serve as a cognitive tool helping to prevent important ethical issues from turning shallow and be affected by biases. Unfortunately, I don’t think it would help even if one day there would actually be a superintelligence system that would really reach the conclusion that the most ethical thing to do is stop procreating.

And that is despite that if the superintelligence system would truly be compassionate, genuinely altruistic, rational, and totally unbiased, then considering the interests of all sentient beings on earth, it is absolutely unquestionable that it would conclude that humans must refrain from procreation. We don’t need a superintelligence system for that conclusion as even in lousy commercial action movies the “bad guys” often argue that humanity is a plague, cancer, a virus and etc. that needs to be destroyed. Humans have never got along with each other. All along history they never stop fighting, looting, killing, raping, destroying everything in their way and everyone they see and can use for their own benefit. They are doing it all along history, with no limits, not even natural ones as they artificially create sentient creatures only to exploit and murder them later. And not only that they almost never miss the chance for harmful actions, they keep inventing new ones. So again, a non-biased superintelligence system shouldn’t even hesitate before concluding that humans must never procreate.

One of the motivations behind this thought experiment is to ignore the noise and to rationally focus only on the empirical data, because cognitive biases such as what Metzinger calls the “existence bias” (humans do almost anything to prolong their existence), interfere with such a process. But why would it be any different when humans would hear the superintelligence system’s conclusion regarding their procreation? Metzinger writes in the article that “sustaining one’s existence is the default goal in almost every case of uncertainty, even if it may violate rationality constraints, simply because it is a biological imperative that has been burned into our nervous systems over millennia.” So there is no reason to believe that the benevolent artificial antinatalism thought experiment, nor the actual existence of a superintelligence system, would make any difference in humans’ unethical behavior.
The problem is not that people don’t know what is right, but that most want what is wrong.
We don’t need technology to help us understand what is right, we need technology to help us implement what is right.

References

Metzinger Thomas Benevolent-Artificial-Anti-Natalism (BAAN) 2017

https://www.edge.org/conversation/thomas_metzinger-benevolent-artificial-anti-natalism-baan

 

 

 

 

They Are All Wrong – Desecrating Life

To sum my view on how human society views cases of ‘Wrongful Life’ I will address a claim which is not only very common in itself, but is also a leitmotif in other claims, and that is the ‘Sanctity of Life’ argument. This argument is echoed in the judicial statements regarding the impossibility to prove that non-existence can be better off than existence, in the argument regarding the disvaluation of life with disability, and of course in the argument that there is danger that Wrongful Life’ suits may pressure medical advisers to suggest abortions, which I have addressed respectively in the former texts regarding the issue of ‘Wrongful Life’. It also leads to the argument regarding the danger of Eugenics and of Genetic Testing, an issue I’ll mainly focus on here. If you haven’t read the former parts yet, it is recommended (though not necessary) to do so before reading this one.

Just a quick reminder, a ‘Wrongful Life’ case is when a child sues for medical negligence a doctor or hospital for failing to diagnose and/or for not informing the child’s parents about a genetic disorder or foetal impairment when abortion was still an option and would have been chosen by the parents had they been informed. The claim in a wrongful-life suit is not that the negligence of the doctor was the cause of the impairment, but that by failing to inform the parents, the doctor is responsible for the birth of an impaired child who otherwise would not have been born and therefore would not experience the suffering caused by the impairment. The lawsuit is in respect of the damage caused by the impairment, this would generally include pain, suffering, and ‘disability costs’—the extra financial costs attributable to the disability, such as the cost of nursing care.

The ‘Sanctity of Life’ argument is rather self-explanatory, to compensate a child for being born goes against the sanctity of life. It is cheapening the idea of ‘life’, and it is by far the opposite of treating life as sacrosanct.

Generally speaking, I disagree with the use of terms such as sanctity, as I don’t think that any form of saintliness exists, but for the sake of the argument, if anything, it is exactly because of the so to speak ‘sanctity of life’ that each must be treated with extreme caution. And extreme caution is certainly not to create them despite foreseen severe impairments.
To sanctify any life no matter how miserable they are expected to be is to cheapen them. It is the ones who refer to any sentient life with extreme caution, who highly consider sentient life’s vulnerability, who carry the heavy burden of moral responsibility regarding it, that really treat life as if they are sacred. It is not the ones who are trying to avoid any case of misery who are cheapening the idea of life, but rather whom who welcomes any kind of misery with open arms.
It is not whom who considers the theoretical risk of misery as a sufficient reason not to create life who disrespects it, but whom who knows that a miserable life is certain and yet insists on it.

If no person should be compensated no matter how miserable the life forced upon that person is, it means that all life is scared and must never be prevented. According to the ‘sanctity of life’ notion they are never a burden but always a blessing, even when they are experienced as the most unsacred thing imaginable by the actual people who are living it.

Claiming that life must be prevented exactly because of how vulnerable and fragile they are, is, if anything, treating it with more sanctity than forcing any of it, in any case. In a way to claim against ‘wrongful life’ cases, let alone against antinatalism, that it is by far the opposite of treating life as sacrosanct, corresponds with the silly common claim that antinatalists are nihilists despite that the opposite is true. As far as most antinatalists go, everything is morally meaningful and that’s why they want to prevent the creation of life. It is exactly antinatalists who understand more than others that everything in life is meaningful (even though most think that life is absolutely absent of any cosmic meaning, there is no contradiction as cosmic meaning and ethical meaning are different things) and therefore it all must be prevented.
In that sense, antinatalism is actually exactly the opposite of nihilism. According to it everything is morally meaningful, every harm, every frustration, every pain, every moment of loneliness, every moment of boredom, each is meaningful in itself for each subjective individual exactly because there is no cosmic meaning to justify them. They are meaningful because they are meaningful to a subject, and they must be avoided because they have no cosmic meaning or any meaning outside the subject who is forced to experience them and for no other reason but that that subject was forced to exist. There is no reason for anyone to experience any of it. Each and every one of them is experienced without any valid justification or purpose. But that doesn’t nullify them of meaning, but on the contrary, had there been a cosmic or some other external meaning then many negative experiences could have been canceled out in the light of the cosmic meaning, at least to some degree. But the fact that there isn’t one, makes every experience meaningful in itself. When experiences exist for their own sake, they become more meaningful, not less. Every experience matters, as experiences are all that there is and the only thing that counts ethically. There is nothing but experiences that has any ethical meaning. Therefore every moment in life matters, and that is exactly the opposite of Nihilism. Of course there are many kinds of antinatalists who emphasize all kinds of reasons and reasoning, but in my case and I am under the strong impression that this is also the case of most antinatalists, it is the suffering that motives them. As opposed to the ridiculous Nihilism claim and to how pro-natalists prefer to think of us, most are motivated by caring and mercy for others. Not by hating their own lives, or life in general, but by hating suffering. Most antinatalists are not driven by their supposed depression or by their pure logic calculation, but rather by concern and compassion. And so, more relevantly to our point here, is that antinatalists are highly sensitive to everything that happens and can happen in life. And that perspective makes antinatalists way more ‘sanctifiers’ of life than pro-natalists.

Attributing something with sanctity means treating it with the highest level of carefulness, respect and responsibility. In that sense, preventing life which are expected to be miserable is to sanctify it much more than not stopping them, let alone using the excuse of protecting the notion of the sanctity of life despite that notion doesn’t have experiences and can’t be harmed by anything, as opposed to actual living creatures who would be forced to experience extreme misery. Sacrificing people in the name of the insentient idea of the ‘sanctity of life’ is not sanctity, it is cruelty.

One of the most dangerous practical implications of the ‘Sanctity of Life’ notion is the opposition to genetic testing.

With techniques such as genetic screening, chorionic villus sampling, amniocentesis, ultrasonography and karyotype analysis, expectant parents come to learn in advance if their conceived child will be born with a congenital disease, deformity and/or disability. Hence, for example, parents-to-be will know beforehand if they are at risk to transmit sickle cell anaemia, and embryos can be detected in utero for Duchene’s muscular dystrophy, Down’s Syndrome or Tay Sachs disease.
Many people oppose genetic testing such as these, which can detect whether there are any inherited disorders, and moreover can predict if any diseases will develop in the future, because that might cause people to decide to terminate the pregnancy.

As antinatalists obviously we think that no person should be created regardless of any congenital impairments, however, it is still better that people who are created would at least have the least congenital impairments possible. One of the most common and strongest antinatalist arguments is that nothing can ever guarantee that someone’s life won’t be miserable, however, genetic tests can at last provide a better starting point by pre-detecting some possible severe congenital impairments. Yet many oppose even that. Even merely providing people with the option of preventing horrible starting points for their children is being opposed.

These claims explicitly say that the less people know the better. These people are afraid that the more expectant parents would know about the expected future of their children the more likely they are to avoid creating it. And what makes it even crazier is that it is not that the people who would choose to terminate the conception in cases of severe congenital impairments would choose not to create a new person at all, I wish that was the case, but unfortunately it is much more probable that these people would terminate that specific conception and try to have another one soon after. These genetic tests are not expected to cause people to create less people, but less severe congenital impairments, and even that is being opposed.

That is, I think, one of the most important conclusions antinatalists should make of the discussion regarding ‘wrongful life’ cases, that there is not even agreement about pre-genetic testing. This is of course extremely disturbing in itself but also particularly for us antinatalists since it indicates how unbridgeable the gap between us and huge parts of the public is.

It is easy to dismiss the notion of the ‘culture of life’ for that matter as being ancient, outdated and anti-scientific, but for example there are about 1.2 billion Catholics, and the Catholic Church preaches that actions such as abortion go against the sanctity of human life and thus the Church disapproves tests such as pre-natal and pre-implantation genetic diagnosis since these tests involve the rejection of several embryos and in certain cases even abortion. Other religions don’t fare much better for that matter.
So this is another issue among many others, that antinatalists must deal with all the time.

Again, I highly oppose the rhetoric of ‘the sanctity of life’, but if anything, it is pre-genetic testing that treats life with sanctity as it expresses respect to the vulnerability, singularity and significance of each individual way more than not even bothering to pre-examine the chances of condemning the to be born with severe congenital impairments. If anything, it is the more tests the higher the value attributed to life and not the other way around. Not to perform every possible test before creating a life is to disrespect it. It is to disrespect the created person, its parents, and society.

Some of its opposers argue that genetic testing might lead to Eugenics.
But obviously there is a huge gap between choosing desirable characteristics and avoiding severe congenital impairments. The genetic testing don’t scan for traits in general and offer people to pick out from an available selection, they scan for potential defects. The issue is not creating children with supposedly better traits but not creating children with surely worse ones. It is not about avoiding traits which are considered as being socially disadvantageous, but about avoiding diseases and traits which are absolutely physically and mentally disadvantageous.
It is a flawed and manipulative comparison aiming at scaring people of designer babies.

We are not even talking here about John Harris and Julian Savulescu’s Principle of Procreative Beneficence (PPB) which claims that couples who decide to create a person have a significant moral obligation to select the child who, given his or her genetic endowment, can be expected to enjoy the most well-being. The issue here is about people having a moral obligation not to create a person who can be expected to endure what is referred to as a wrongful-life.

Some even go the distance and almost say that suffering is desirable. For example in his book The Worth of a Child, Thomas Murray writes:

“The quest for perfection has been spurred by a desire to escape the limitations and especially the hurts that mark indelibly our existence as finite, embodied, independent beings. The danger in that quest is that we can become so attracted to some superhuman idea or entity that we lose sight of, or even come to have contempt for, the actual flawed and vulnerable human beings with whom we live.” (p. 136)

But preventing suffering should be an aspiration not a danger. Only because it is so obvious that life is full of pain and suffering can it be presented in such a nonchalant, if not favorable manner. Why not prevent as much suffering as possible when we can? What is so good about suffering? If it is because it is very humanlike, so are wars, should we not do everything possible to prevent them? Why perpetuate, let alone almost glorify, impairments? all the more so ones that can easily be avoided?

The fact that there are no perfect babies is not a justification to create ones with severe congenital impairments. In fact it is a justification not to create ones at all. That is because the standard for forcing something on someone should be that there would be no harms at all, in other words that it would be perfect. And perfection is not even theoretically a remotely possible option.

If there is a firm opposition not to eugenics but to genetic testing, despite that it doesn’t aim at prioritizing traits which people find desirable, but at preventing diseases and other congenital horrible conditions that no one finds desirable, then what are the odds of convincing every person that every creation of a new person is wrong?

While we don’t need genetic testing to realize that all life is wrong and that we must avoid all of it, there are many people who think that there is no need for genetic testing because all life is a sacred gift of infinite value so no one must ever avoid any of it. Not even when the children and parents wish that they could, a scenario that causes the life “sanctifiers” not only to find genetic testing unneeded but also very problematic, as according to them no one should have the chance of ending no life.
That’s how deep the gap is. And that’s why we shouldn’t keep trying to fill it but to somehow work around it.

References

Begeal, Brady “Burdened by Life: A Brief Comment on Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life.” Albany Gov’t Law Review Fireplace Blog. 2011. Accessed Jun 1, 2012. http://aglr.wordpress.com/2011/03/28/burdened-by-life-a-brief-comment-on-wrongfulbirth-and-wrongful-life

Benatar D (2006) Better never to have been: the harm of coming into existence. Clarendon, Oxford

Botkin Jeffrey R., “Ethical Issues and Practical Problems in Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis,” Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 26, no. 1 (1998): 17-28.

Ettorre Elizabeth, “Reproductive Genetics, Gender and the Body: ‘Please Doctor, may I have a Normal Baby?’,” Sociology 34 no. 3 (2000): 403-420.

Gardner, M. (2016). Beneficence and procreation. Philosophical Studies; 173(2) 321-336

Giesen Ivo, “Of wrongful birth, wrongful life, comparative law and the politics of tort law systems,” Journal of Contemporary Roman-Dutch Law 72 (2009): 257-273.

Harris John, “The Wrong of Wrongful Life,” Journal of Law and Society 17, no. 1 (1990): 90.

Hensel Wendy F., “The Disabling Impact of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life Actions,” Harvard Civil RightsCivil Liberties Law Review 40 (2005): 141-195.

Jennifer Ann Rinaldi, “Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth: The Devaluation of Life With Disability,” Journal of Public Policy, Administration and Law, 1 (2009): 1-7; Liu, “Wrongful life: some of the problems.”

Kumar R (2015) Risking and wronging. Philos Public Aff 43(1):27–51

Liu, Athena N. C. “Wrongful life: some of the problems.” Journal of Medical Ethics 13 (1987): 69-73.

Loth Marc A., Courts in quest for legitimacy; the case of wrongful life (Rotterdam: Erasmus University, 2007).

Mackenzie Robin. From Sanctity To Screening: Genetic Disabilities, Risk And Rhetorical Strategies In Wrongful Birth And Wrongful Conception Cases Feminist Legal Studies 7: 175–191, 1999

Morreim E. Haavi, “The Concept of Harm Reconceived: A Different Look at Wrongful Life,” Law and Philosophy 7, no. 1 (1988): 3-33.

Morris Anne and Saintier Severine, “To Be or Not to Be: Is That The Question? Wrongful Life and Misconceptions,” Medical Law Review 11 (2003): 167-193.

Murtaugh Michael T., “Wrongful Birth: The Courts’ Dilemma in Determining a Remedy for a Blessed Event,” Pace Law Review 27, no. 2 (2007): 243

Parfit, Derek. Reasons and Persons. (Oxford University Press 1986)

Ramos-Ascensão José, “Welcoming the more vulnerable: do parents have a right to selection of a healthy child?” Europeinfos – Christians perspectives on the EU, 2012: 5, accessed Aug 4, 2013, http://www.comece.eu/europeinfos/en/archive/issue153/article/5140.html

Robertson John A., “Extending preimplantation genetic diagnosis: the ethical debate – Ethical issues in new uses of preimplantation genetic diagnosis,” Human Reproduction 18, no. 3 (2003): 465-471

Sàndor Judit, “From Assisted to Selective Reproduction: Through the Lens of the Court,” The Faculty of Law – Norway, 2013: 14, accessed Jan 14, 2014, http://www.jus.uio.no/english/research/news-andevents/events/conferences/2014/wccl-cmdc/wccl/papers/ws7/w7-sandor.pdf

Savulescu J. Procreative Beneficence: why we should select the best children. Bioethics 200115413–426

Seana Valentine Shiffrin. Harm And Its Moral Significance. Legal Theory, Available on CJO 2012 doi:10.1017/S1352325212000080

Sheldon Sally and Wilkinson Stephen. Termination of Pregnancy for reason of foetal disability: Are there grounds for a special exception in Law? Medical Law Review, 9 (2) pp 85-109

Steinbock, Bonnie, Life Before Birth (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992)

Steinbock Bonnie & McClamrock Bonnie When is Birth Unfair to the Child? University at Albany, SUNY January 1994

Steininger Barbara C., “Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life: Basic Questions,” Journal of European Tort Law 2 (2010): 125-155

Stretton, Dean. “The Birth Torts: Damages for Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life.” Deakin Law Review 10, no. 1 (2005): 319-364

Vesta T. Silva (2011) Lost Choices and Eugenic Dreams: Wrongful Birth Lawsuits in Popular News Narratives, Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies, 8:1, 22-40, DOI: 10.1080/14791420.2010.543985

Webber Jay, “Better Off Dead?” First Things, (2002): 10

Weinberg, Rivka. Existence: who needs it? The non-identity problem and merely possible people
2012 Bioethics ISSN 0269-9702

They Are All Wrong – Procreation is Always a Very Serious Crime

The former two texts address couple of the most common arguments against ‘Wrongful Life’ claims. If you haven’t read them yet, it is recommended (though not necessary) to do so before reading this one, which addresses another common argument against ‘Wrongful Life’ claims, that is that they would put pressure on doctors to advise people to have abortions.

Just a quick reminder, a ‘Wrongful Life’ case is when a child sues for medical negligence a doctor or hospital for failing to diagnose and/or for not informing the child’s parents about a genetic disorder or foetal impairment when abortion was still an option and would have been chosen by the parents had they been informed. The claim in a wrongful-life suit is not that the negligence of the doctor was the cause of the impairment, but that by failing to inform the parents, the doctor is responsible for the birth of an impaired child who otherwise would not have been born and therefore would not experience the suffering caused by the impairment. The lawsuit is in respect of the damage caused by the impairment, this would generally include pain, suffering, and ‘disability costs’—the extra financial costs attributable to the disability, such as the cost of nursing care.

A quite common claim against ‘Wrongful Life’ suits is that it would put a lot of pressure on medical advisers to suggest abortions in cases of foreseen or a suspicion for impairments, out of fear of being sued for damages. That might indeed happen, but of course the creation of people with severe impairments merely to avoid doctors being pressured to encourage abortions out of fear of being sued, can never be morally justified.

Every breeding case is performed without the consent of whom who is supposed to be the protagonist of the action. But in ‘Wrongful Life’ cases the omission of consent is even more extreme as it is not even performed with the consent of the children’s parents, who had they been informed about their children’s impairments they would have had an abortion. And according to the above claim, these children should not even be compensated for their harm since that might put pressure on doctors to advise other people to do – what these people would have done had they been informed – an abortion.

Anyone who is not adherently opposed to abortions shouldn’t be so alarmed by a potential pressure put on doctors to advice it. And anyone who is adherently opposed to the creation of people with severe impairments is supposed to be in favor of such a pressure, in the aspiration that as many preconception and prenatal testing as possible are performed to avoid as many impairments as possible.

Of course I can’t speak for other antinatalists other than myself, but in spite that on the face of it the argument that ‘Wrongful Life’ claims disvalue the life of people with disabilities is supposed to be the more challenging one for us antinatalists, I feel most uneasy with this one. That is because on the one hand I have no doubt in my mind that these are cases of medical negligence as surly the doctors could have prevented the children’s suffering had they informed their parents. But on the other hand, parents, all parents, can’t always prevent the misery caused to their children, which statistically may be smaller and less probable than the cases at the center of this text, but sometimes can also be worse than these cases. Accidents and horrible events that take place along the way can turn someone’s life to be much worse than someone who was born with impairments. The life of a person who was born with impairments that luckily don’t involve chronic pain, can be much less worse than people who weren’t born with impairments but life somehow hit them hard along the way and turned their existence into an ongoing misery.
Life necessarily involves many unavoidable harms which none of them are necessary and people are forced to endure them only because their parents have decided to create them. Shouldn’t parents have some responsibility over their children’s harm?
Only because harms are so natural, mandatory and self-evident we treat them with acceptance. But they are unnecessary, and causing unnecessary harm is morally wrong.
Pain, frustration, sickness, boredom, fatigue, weariness and etc., are all certain and unavoidable, shouldn’t parents have some responsibility for not preventing it or getting consent from their children about it?
We don’t need genetic screenings to figure out that harms would occur. And the harmed is never informed, not to mention agrees to any of them before being created.

Some supporters of ‘wrongful life’ cases, claim that the plaintiffs need not to show the court that non-existence is a preferable option, but only to show that they suffer from reasonably foreseeable, and preventable harms caused by the defendants. Yet, isn’t it the case that everyone suffers from reasonably foreseeable, and preventable harms caused by the parents?

That is why although I agree that indeed there is a criminal negligence by the medical staff in these cases of procreation, there is a criminal negligence by the parents in every case of procreation.
While the doctors are guilty not of causing harm but of not preventing harm, the parents are guilty of both causing harm and of not preventing it. The parents are guilty of every harm they would personally and directly cause to their children, and for not preventing every harm that would be caused to their children by everything that is not them.
Every procreation is a case of criminal negligence by the parents because of all the misery that can happen to all people, at any given moment, and for all the misery that would be caused by all people at any given moment.

So I agree that the pressure put on doctors is unfair, but obviously not because of fear of more abortions, but because most of the liability must still be put on the parents. That is since the option of the doctors missing or not informing the parents about impairments is always there, not to mention the option of misery not caused by doctors’ negligence but by something else later in life, therefore it is still, and always, the parents’ responsibility.

Surly the doctors are guilty of criminal negligence for not adequately examining the possibility of impairments, or for not informing the parents about examined impairments, giving them the chance to have an abortion. But the bigger crime is that people are in the position of deciding whether to have an abortion or not in the first place. The major issue is the situation in which people can decide whether to create a person without that person’s consent, while running the risk of that person being miserable, without having any justified reason or purpose, and with that person being forced to endure pain, fear, sickness, frustration, regret, broken-heartedness, boredom, death, the fear of death, and etc.

The doctors’ actions are criminal because had they informed the parents these pregnancies wouldn’t have ended with a ‘wrongful life’ but with abortion. But every case of pregnancy that doesn’t end with abortion ends with a ‘wrongful life’ because every case of procreation is a very serious crime.

Procreation is a very serious crime because it is forcing on someone else the most important decision in that person’s life.

Procreation is a very serious crime because it is harming someone else without that person’s consent.

Procreation is a very serious crime because it is gambling on someone else’s life.

Procreation is a very serious crime because it is forcing someone into a needless, pointless, absurd, constant chase after meaning in a meaningless, needless, pointless, and absurd world.

Procreation is a very serious crime because it is forcing someone into a needless, pointless, absurd, constant chase after pleasures despite that pleasures are not really intrinsically good but addictive falsehood smoke screen illusions, which trap sentient beings in an endless, pointless and vain seek for more of them. Pleasures are preceded by wants which are the absence of objects desired by subjects. People want because they are missing something. They seek pleasures to release the tension of craving. Craving or wants, are at least bad experiences if not a sort of pain. Pleasures are short and temporary, and compel a preceding deprivation, a want or a need, which is not always being fulfilled, rarely to the desired measure, and almost never exactly when wanted. And even when desires are fulfilled, the cycle starts again.

Procreation is a crime because it is forcing someone into a situation where pain is the natural default state. If one would stop all action, pains would attack very shortly in the form of hunger, thirst, boredom, loneliness, physical discomfort, thermal discomfort and etc. Pain comes if one does nothing. Pleasures are unguaranteed, brief, and at some point become boring and ineffective. There is no chronic pleasure, but there is definitely chronic pain. And it is quite abundant. Pain is always guaranteed for every person born.

Procreation is a very serious crime because it is forcing someone into a needless, pointless, absurd, constant chase after happiness – despite that according to the “set point” theory of happiness (which many psychologists find convincing nowadays), mood is homeostatic and we all have a fixed average level of happiness. That means that even desirable things which people do manage to obtain, are satisfying at first, but eventually people adapt to them and return to their “set points”. Therefore people usually end up more or less on the same level of wellbeing they were before. That’s why some argue that people actually run on hedonic treadmills.

Procreation is a very serious crime because there is a very realistic probability that a person forced into existence would be miserable. There is not even a theoretical possibility that a person forced into existence won’t be harmed at all. Creating someone who would definitely be harmed and the only variable is to what extent (with the potential of extreme misery), must be morally prohibited. Given that the motives are never the interests of the to-be born person, it is not only morally flawed, it is selfish, egocentric, arrogant, and careless.

Procreation is a very serious crime because the ample evidences that bad experiences are more important than good ones, not only serve as a proof that good experiences are at least not as good as bad experiences are bad (if not proving that bad experiences almost always outweigh the good ones), but how horrible life actually and inherently is. Basically, pain and other negative experiences, increase the fitness of individuals by enhancing their respondence ability to threats to their survival and reproduction. It has a crucial adaptive function. Existing sentient beings are tortured by evolutionary mechanisms which their only point is that additional sentient beings would exist, regardless of any of those beings’ personal wellbeing. It is a pointless, frustrating and painful trap.

Procreation is a very serious crime because it is treating someone as a means to others’ ends. People create new persons to serve their own purposes such as to take care of them when they are old, to save their decaying relationships, to continue the family line, to please their parents, to ease their boredom, to fill their empty and pointless lives with a sense of meaning and purpose, to feel powerful because someone is totally depended on them, to feel needed and important, to ease their loneliness, to hush their biological impulses, to boost their ego, to create an immortality illusion, to take care of society’s elderly, to be loved even if that love is temporary and conditioned and a result of imprinting and not of free choice and objective assessments, to continue the human race, to feel normal, to make them look normal to others. And creating extremely emotionally and physically vulnerable persons as means to others’ ends is a very serious crime.

Procreation is a very serious crime because it diverts energy, time and resources from persons who already exist and are in need, to those who needed nothing, were deprived of nothing, and harmed by nothing before they were forced into existence.

Procreation is a very serious crime because life is a constant Sisyphean struggle just to survive a life no one chose. Everyone is bound to overcome needless frustrations, disappointments, pains and discomforts.

Procreation is a very serious crime because people are creating new persons for their own selfish sake and count on that their children would adapt and adjust to the difficulties of life, just like everybody else does. Only that not everyone manages to adapt to life’s difficulties, and even if everyone did, why condemn people to such a state in the first place? Why knowingly create someone who would have to adjust to bad situations, instead of easily avoiding any bad situation that person would be forced to endure coming to existence? Why consciously choose to throw other people into the position in which they must always compromise and never get everything they want?

Procreation is a very serious crime because lives not worth living is not a theoretical possibility, it is a certainty. People whose lives are not worth living would be born, and the chances for that happening are renewed with each procreation. Misery has no quota. The only way to avoid this worse off option is by not procreating.

Procreation is a very serious crime because there is no way to retroactively undo it, and there is also not an easy and harmless option to end one’s existence by carrying out suicide. Many people are trapped in horrible lives without a truly viable option to end it because they are too afraid to kill themselves, or because they don’t want to hurt the ones who care about them if they do, or are too afraid that if they won’t succeed in killing themselves they would be socially stigmatized in the better case, or coercively hospitalized in a worse one, or harm themselves so severely while trying to kill themselves that they would end up even worse than they were. Trapping people in the impossible situation of not wanting to live but not wanting to kill themselves so not to hurt others or because they are afraid to kill themselves for any of the mentioned reasons, is a very serious crime.

Procreation is a very serious crime because it forces someone to die, and to fear of death for most of one’s life.

Procreation is a very serious crime because people can choose whether to create sentient creatures who would necessarily suffer from many bad experiences that they have necessarily not given consent to, and with no guarantee whatsoever that the created persons won’t be very miserable, yet they choose to do so anyway. They choose that other persons would experience pain, frustration, fear, boredom, they choose they would get disappointed, sick, rejected, and humiliated. Yes, that person may enjoy parts of life too, but that is not mandatory, while it is mandatory that this short list of bad things will happen at some point, at least once in each person’s life. Despite that pleasure is optional, happiness isn’t even optional, and suffering is inevitable, people criminally choose to willingly force sentient creatures into this condition.

And finally, more than anything, what makes procreation such a serious crime, is that it is forcing enormous needless and pointless suffering on thousands of individuals vulnerable to harms. While the person created is one morally relevant creature which would be harmed by being created, each person created is hurting infinitely more morally relevant creatures during a lifetime.


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